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Introduction  
 
Initial Coin Offerings (“ICOs”) are becoming an important source of funding for 
companies,4 especially startups. In 2017, ICOs raised around $4 billion in the United 
States,5 reaching more than $21 billion in 20186 and surpassing venture capital as a 
fundraising mechanism.7   
 
According to the Gartner hype cycle of new technologies,8 blockchain technologies are 
extremely hyped.9 Nevertheless, they still offer the potential for substantial change in 
technology development and delivery, disrupting how the economy, businesses and our 
society operate.  
 
The growth of ICOs and accompanying instances of fraud have become increasingly 
obvious, attracting the attention of regulators.  However, due to the distinctive features of 
the blockchain technologies of which they are based on, such regulation is extremely 
different from more common forms of regulation in other industries, and varies across 
jurisdictions. Unlike traditional investments like stocks and bonds, ICOs issue crypto-
assets. Essentially, crypto-assets are digital representations of value utilizing blockchain 
technologies, where ledgers keep track of ownership using peer-to-peer networks of 
computers.  This system is decentralized and as such eludes historical markets where 
central intermediaries (like broker dealers, exchanges, etc.) facilitate transactions. 
 
In this paper we analyze the legal and financial aspects of ICOs, providing a set of 
recommendations to enhance the regulatory framework of this new source of finance.  It is 
organized as follows. In Part I, we examine the concept, features and structure of an ICO.  
We note that because ICOs ultimately run on technology connecting buyers and sellers, or 
holders of a crypto-asset, they do not feature centralized intermediaries or gatekeepers in 
their transactions. They thus have no historical precedent and raise challenging questions 
for authorities tasked with overseeing crypto markets. In Part II, we analyze different 
regulatory approaches to deal with ICOs. We argue that none of the existing regulatory 
models provide an efficient and effective response to the challenges raised by ICOs. For 
                                                          
4 In a world of ICOs, not all issuers of tokens are “companies”. For this reason, this paper will also use other 
words to refer to the issuers such as “founders”, “developers” or “issuers” themselves. Following this, all these 
expressions will be used as synonyms in this paper.   
5 Frank Chaparro, ICO funding soars above $4 billion as US regulators crack down. BUSINESS INSIDER (2017), 
available at http://www.businessinsider.com/ico-funding-soars-above-4-billion-as-us-regulators-crack-down-
2017-12 
6 See https://www.coinschedule.com/stats.html?year=2018. See also  https://www.economist.com/technology-
quarterly/2018/09/01/initial-coin-offerings-have-become-big-business and 
https://www.ft.com/content/69abdb66-666c-11e8-b6eb-4acfcfb08c11. The latter article also points out that 
block.one, a Cayman Islands-based company, raised more than 4 billion through a single ICO.  
7 Betsy Verecky, Is a Cryptocurrency a Security? Depends, MIT Management Sloan School (2018), available 
at http://mitsloan.mit.edu/newsroom/articles/is-a-cryptocurrency-a-security-
depends/?utm_source=mitsloanlinkedin&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=gensler. 
8 The hype cycle is a branded graphical presentation developed and used by the American research, advisory 
and information technology firm Gartner to represent the maturity, adoption, and social application of specific 
technologies. The hype cycle provides a graphical and conceptual presentation of the maturity of emerging 
technologies through five phases. 
9
 See Mike Walker, Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies 2018, GARTNER (2018), available at: 
https://www.gartner.com/doc/3885468/hype-cycle-emerging-technologies-  
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this reason, we will propose a series of reforms to enhance the existing regulatory models. 
Part III deals with the accounting and financial issues of ICOs. It will emphasize that the 
classification of tokens as debt or equity may have several implications from a legal and 
financial perspective. In Part VI, we will focus on the corporate governance aspects of 
ICOs. Namely, it will be shown that the purchasers of tokens are highly exposed to the risk 
of opportunism of the ICO’s promoter. As a result, a variety of legal and market devices 
will be proposed to minimize those agency problems existing between issuers and buyers 
of tokens. Part V analyzes how ICOs may raise issues related to money-laundering, and 
how regulators and policy-makers can deal with these problems. In Part VI, we provide an 
overview of the challenges of ICOs from the perspective of privacy law and data 
protection. Part VII examines how a situation of insolvency may affect the issuer and buyer 
of tokens, and how insolvency jurisdictions should deal with those issues arising in 
insolvency proceedings involving crypto-assets. In Part VIII, we discuss the jurisdictional 
issues arising in ICOs, and why regulators, policy-makers and international organizations 
such as the International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) should work 
together to promote coordination in a variety of issues regarding ICOs. Part IX describes 
the future of capital markets and corporate governance in a world of tokenized securities. 
Part X concludes.  
 
I. Concept, Features and Structure of ICOs  
 
An ICO is a new method to raise capital. This new method differs from existing fundraising 
mechanisms in four primary aspects. First, the person seeking to raise capital does not 
issue shares, bonds, or any other existing financial products. Instead, they will use crypto-
assets, often referred to as tokens,10 which entitle the owner to a variety of rights. Second, 
the issuer does not receive money, as it happens with an issuance of shares or bonds. 
Instead, it receives crypto-assets generally accepted by the public such as Bitcoin or 
Ether. Third, the issuance of tokens is not conducted through the traditional channel in 
which the regulator and other third parties, such as investment banks, need to 
intermediate. Instead, it is conducted through a new technology, blockchain, which is the 
technology used to create crypto-assets such as Bitcoin or Ether. Finally, unlike what 
occurs with many other issuances of shares, bonds or other type of securities, the 
issuance of tokens does not require the preparation and registration of a prospectus, 
unless those tokens are considered securities under a country’s securities law. Indeed, in 
an issuance not involving securities, the issuer will just be required to prepare a simple 
document, which is not subject to any supervision or imposition of mandatory terms. This 
document is termed a “white paper”. This white paper is the primary disclosure obligation 
of an ICO provided that the tokens issued by the promoter are not deemed as “securities” 
under the relevant country’s securities law.    
 
This section will provide a common understanding of these primary aspects of an ICO.   
 
1. Tokens 
                                                          
10 Crypto-assets, tokens, or digital assets are usually used as synonyms. For example, the Mexican Fintech 
law refers to these instruments as ‘virtual assets’. In Singapore, the regulator uses the term ‘digital token’. In 
Switzerland and the United States, the securities regulator uses the expression ‘tokens’. In the United 
Kingdom, the regulator uses ‘crypto-assets’, which are then classified in different types of ‘tokens’.  
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ICOs are also known as token sales or coin sales.11 Tokens are basically digital assets 
used in connection with decentralized services, applications, and communities known as 
token networks. In other words, tokens are digital assets that are recorded on a distributed 
ledger and can be transferred without an intermediary.12 This means that the structuring of 
the issuance, the pricing of the offer and the distribution of these instruments do not 
involve the participation of any regulated entity like, for example, an investment bank. A 
common scenario is for tokens to be sold even before the token network is operational. In 
some of these cases, the tokens will be functional once the platform is developed.  
 
1.1 The concept and features of tokens  
 
There is no unified classification of tokens. Tokens may differ from one another, and 
different countries may even adopt different classifications to refer to similar tokens. In our 
opinion, it might be useful to classify tokens by two factors: (i) functionality of the token, 
which focuses on the function and economic substance of the token; and (ii) legal nature 
of the token, which is based on the particular features of the token (including its 
distribution), and the definition of “security” established in a particular jurisdiction.13 In Part 
III, we will include a third classification based on the nature of the token from a financial 
perspective. This latter classification, which categorizes tokens as debt or equity 
instruments, will be particularly relevant from an accounting and financial perspective, as 
well as for a variety of legal issues (e.g., covenants, distribution of dividends or, especially 
in some civil law countries, directors’ duties and liability in situations in which the 
company´s net capital falls below a certain percentage of the legal capital).  
 
2.1.1. Functional classification  
 
From the perspective of their functionality, this paper follows the classification of tokens 
proposed by the Swiss Financial Markets Supervisory Authority (“FINMA”). FINMA 
categorizes tokens into three types: (i) payment tokens; (ii) utility tokens; and (iii) asset 
tokens.14 Likewise, they recognize that “hybrid” tokens can also exist. FINMA defines 
payment tokens as synonymous with cryptocurrencies.15 Therefore, these tokens are only 
used to make payments generally with the issuer – for example, to purchase a future 
product or service in which the only accepted payment are these “cryptocurrencies” issued 
                                                          
11 International Organization of Securities Commissions. IOSCO Board Communication on Concerns Related 
to Initial Coin Offerings, Media Release (2018), available at: 
https://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS485.pdf 
12 Alfonso Delgado et al, Towards a Sustainable ICO Process: Community Guidelines on Regulation and Best 
Practices (2016) (available at http://extropy.io/publications/bluepaper.pdf). 
13 Some authors and jurisdictions distinguish between ‘security tokens’ and ‘utility tokens’ . For example, see 
the guidance of crypto-assets issued by the Financial Conduct Authority (available at 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp19-03.pdf). See also Finance Working Paper N° 564/2018, 
Sabrina T. Howell, Marina Niessner, and David Yermack, Initial Coin Offerings: Financing Growth with 
Cryptocurrency Token Sales, ECGI FINANCE WORKING PAPER N° 564/201 (available at 
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/finalhowellniessneryermack.pdf). In our 
opinion, this classification adopted by many authors and countries confuses the function of the token with its 
legal nature. Therefore, it should be abandoned. Otherwise, it can be misleading, since ‘utility tokens’ from a 
functional perspective can actually be considered ‘security tokens’ from a legal perspective and vice-versa.  
14 Seehttps://www.finma.ch/en/news/2018/02/20180216-mm-ico-wegleitung/ 
15 Ibid. 
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by the promoter. The ability of these tokens to serve as a payment method elsewhere will 
depend on the acceptance of these tokens by third parties.  
 
The concept of utility tokens used by FINMA refers to those tokens that are intended to 
provide digital access to an application or service.16 Therefore, many companies 
developing technological products may opt for the issuance of this type of tokens. From a 
financial and accounting perspective, these tokens seem to reflect the purchase of a future 
good or service provided by the issuer. Finally, FINMA defines asset tokens as those 
representing assets enabling token owners’ participation in real underlying companies, or 
earnings streams, or an entitlement to dividends or interest payments.17 In terms of their 
economic function, these tokens are analogous to equities, bonds or derivatives.18  
 
2.1.2. Legal classification  
 
The functional classification is very useful in understanding the features, nature and 
economic function of tokens. Likewise, it may provide some guidance about the tentative 
regulations applicable to the tokens. For example, as asset tokens are analogous to debt 
or equity, these tokens probably fall into the definition of “securities”. Nevertheless, this 
intuitive relationship between the functional classification and the legal classification is just 
that: intuitive. Indeed, the fact that a token is an “asset token” from a functional perspective 
does not necessarily mean that, from a legal perspective, the same token is a security 
token – even though it will usually be so.  
 
Perhaps more importantly, the fact that a token is classified as “payment token” or “utility 
token” from a functional perspective does not mean that these tokens cannot be 
considered as securities. The classification of a token as a “security token” or a “non-
security token”, which are legal classifications, will depend on how a particular country 
defines “securities”. 19 In general, this judgment should be made after assessing a variety 
                                                          
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 See https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2018/02/20180216-mm-ico-wegleitung/.  
19 For example, in the United States, securities are defined according to the “Howey test”, which basically 
requires the existence of four elements: (i) an investment of money; (ii) the expectation of profits from that 
investment; (iii) the existence of a common enterprise; and (iv) the generation of profits derived from the efforts 
of a promoter or third party. For a detailed analysis of the “Howey Test”, and more generally the concept of 
security in the United States, see John Coffee, Jr. and Hillary A. Sale, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (Foundation Press, 12th Edition, 2012), 246-327. This definition of security follows a functional 
approach and it is focused on the economic substance of the investment rather than its legal form. In countries 
in which the concept of security is defined following this functional approach, it will be easier that an investment 
is considered a “security”. However, this is not always the case. In some countries, the concept of security is 
established in a more formalistic way. Namely, the legislator may establish the type of financial instruments 
that can be considered a security (e.g., shares, bonds, etc.), as it happens in Singapore. As a result, any 
financial instrument which is not specially mentioned in legislation would be excluded from the scope of 
securities regulation. Finally, other countries may follow an intermediate approach: to facilitate the identification 
of a security, they may establish a list of financial instruments that are always deemed a “security”, but they 
also allow other financial instruments that may meet certain requirements to be considered “securities”. This 
latter approach is followed, for example, in Spain (see article 2 of the 2015 Securities Market Act). The 
approach followed by a legal system to define “security” will have great implications in the context of ICOs. For 
instance, while countries with a flexible concept of securities, as it happens in the United States, will make 
easier to include a token within the scope of securities regulatation, those countries defining securities by 
reference to a given list of financial instruments will unlikely allow a token to be classified as a security unless 
the legislation is amended to especially include tokens (or a particular type of tokens) as securities. For a 
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of factors, including the structure of the token, the functionality of the token, and the way 
the token was distributed. If, according to a particular legal system, a token is classified as 
a “security”, these tokens will be classified as “security tokens” from a legal perspective, 
and the issuance of these tokens should comply with existing securities laws. In contrast, if 
a token does not meet the requirements existing in a particular country to be considered a 
“security”, the token will be classified as a “non-security token” for the purpose of this 
paper. Therefore, the issuance will not have to comply with existing securities laws.  
 
Sometimes, the features of the token will determine its legal nature. However, as shown by 
cases such as Munchee,20 the distribution of the token may end up being the defining 
factor distinguishing a token from a security. Therefore, even though a functional 
classification of tokens can be useful for several purposes, the legal classification of the 
token will require a deeper analysis of the token as well as the circumstances surrounding 
the issuance.  
 
In many situations, issuers will ask third parties (usually lawyers) to provide advice about 
the nature of the token.21 In cases in which a formal legal opinion is issued, the issuer 
should enjoy a presumption of good faith when analyzing whether it made a mistake in the 
issuance of tokens – for instance, not complying with securities regulations when it should. 
However, if it were shown that the third party acted in bad faith or with gross negligence, 
these “gatekeepers” could be held liable.22 For this reason, we would recommend that, 
regardless of the potential use of gatekeepers, regulators should implement a kind of 
“regulatory sandbox” in which they work with the issuers in order to let them know the 
nature of their issuance and the applicable law.23 If issuers follow these steps, good faith 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
useful analysis of a variety of tokens to see whether they meet the requirements to be considered “securities” 
under Singapore law, see Monetary Authority of Singapore, A guide to digital token offerings (2018), 10-19.  
20 Munchee was a California-based company that was seeking $15 million in capital to improve an existing 
iPhone app focused on restaurant meal reviews. It sought to create an “ecosystem” in which Munchee and 
other companies would buy and sell goods and services using the tokens.  The company communicated 
through its website, a white paper, and other means how the proceeds were used to create the ecosystem, 
including payments in tokens to users for writing food reviews and selling both advertising to restaurants and 
“in-app” purchases to app users in exchange for tokens. According to the white paper, during the offering, the 
company and other promoters emphasized that investors could expect that efforts by the company and others 
would lead to an increase in the value of the tokens. Based on this statement made by the company, the SEC 
decided to open an investigation for violation of federal securities regulation. Munchee consented to the SEC’s 
cease-and-desist order without admitting or denying the findings. See SEC Press Release, Company Halts 
ICO After SEC Raises Registration Concerns, Securities and Exchange Commission (December, 2017), 
available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-227    
21 These “third parties” are often called “gatekeepers”. In general, a gatekeeper can be defined as a 
professional who is positioned so as to able to prevent wrongdoing by withholding necessary cooperation or 
consent. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 1 
JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATION 53. For an analysis of the concept of “gatekeepers” and how 
lawyers, auditors, securities analysts, credit rating agencies and investment bankers can serve as such 
players, see John Coffee, Jr., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Oxford University 
Press, 2006) 
22 Liability for legal opinions is a controversial issue. In general, it will depend on the jurisdiction and the role 
played by legal opinions in that particular jurisdiction. In the United States, for example, see Joseph L. 
Johnson, Liability of Attorneys for Legal Opinions Under the Federal Securities Laws, 27 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW 
REVIEW 325.  
23 This approach seems to have been followed by the Spanish Securities Market Authority (CNMV) in the ICO 
launched by Home Meal. See http://www.europapress.es/economia/finanzas-00340/noticia-cnmv-dispuesta-
colaborar-home-meal-duena-nostrum-lanzar-ico-espana-20180228164239.html  
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derived from their behavior should be an irrebuttable presumption. Moreover, they will 
receive protection without bearing the costs associated with the issuance of a formal legal 
opinion. 
 
1.2  The pre-sale of tokens 
 
As mentioned, tokens can either be functional or non-functional. Non-functional tokens 
have the sole use of acting as a fundraising mechanism and are offered to the public when 
the token network has not been developed. Non-functional tokens do not contain any 
features that are intrinsically-linked to a blockchain project. Thus, their value is driven only 
by speculation.24 The pre-sale of tokens is not unusual. Around 70% of ICO tokens had 
been previously offered in a presale to a private investor group prior to the crowdsale.25 
 
A pre-sale or a pre-ICO is a term that refers to the process that takes place before the 
crowdsale begins. It usually allows the investors to buy tokens before the crowdsale starts. 
Moreover, this token sale event usually has separate smart contracts from the main  
 crowdsale event.26 The main idea of a pre-sale is to provide discounts. The buyers that 
participate in the pre-sale often get cheaper prices per token. As ICOs impose a minimum 
and maximum threshold for their token crowdsales, blockchain startups often present 
discounted rates and merits for investors that purchase their crypto-tokens at an early 
stage.27 Thus, investors in the crowdsale phase of the ICO are required to purchase 
tokens at a higher rate than early investors. In other words, ICO pre-sales provide benefits 
for early investors. According to blockchain investment funds and even Ethereum co-
founder, Vitalik Buterin, since 2017, the incentivization system for early investors by 
popular ICOs has led to the network congestion of Ethereum, driving transaction fees 
above average. When a large number of ICOs are in the works, people will likely buy 
quantities of Ether so that they can invest in said ICOs — which may drive up the price of 
the cryptocurrency. During times when Ether’s price skyrockets, transaction fees can 
become more expensive. For instance in March of 2017, Ethereum co-founder Vitalik 
Buterin revealed that an investor in the ICO of BAT spent $2,210 as a transaction fee for 
one payment to receive the advantages and discounts granted to early investors. 28 
 
Some companies decide to conduct the pre-sale of tokens only with “accredited” investors. 
By some informal accounts, funds from accredited investors make up between 60%-80% 
of the total funds raised in a direct token pre-sale.29 These market players, including 
                                                          
24 Alfonso Delgado et al. Towards a Sustainable ICO Process: Community Guidelines on Regulation and Best 
Practices (2016), pp. 33. 
25 This percentage is based on a sample of 450 ICOs. See Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Douglas W. 
Arner and Linus Fôhr, The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a scam, It’s a bubble, It’s a super challenge for regulators. 
EUROPEAN BANKING INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES 2018 – NO. 18 (2018) pp. 11.  
26 See Hackernoon, How is the Presale Different From the Crowdsale. https://hackernoon.com/how-is-the-
presale-different-from-the-crowdsale-f369f484794d  
27 These discount rates can go up to 30%. For example, in the ICO of the messaging application Kik, the pre-
ICO sale allowed Blockchain Capital, Pantera Capital and Polychain Capital to purchase kin tokens at a 30 
percent discounted rate. See https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/29/kik-ico-september-125-million/ and 
https://www.reddit.com/r/KinFoundation/comments/743eim/icos_must_stop_institutional_investors_from/  
28 See https://www.ccn.com/hedge-funds-investing-early-in-icos-is-abusive-cryptocurrency-investor/  
29 See Juan Batiz-Benet, Jesse Clayburgh and Marco Santori. The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant Token 
Sale Framework. Protocol Labs & Cooley LLP (2017) (available at: https://saftproject.com/static/SAFT-Project-
White paper.pdf ) pp. 4. 
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accredited investors such as hedge funds, are performing bump-and-dump practices in 
ICO markets when participating in pre-sales of tokens.30  
 
Furthermore, in these token pre-sales, some issuers enter into a Simple Agreement for 
Future Tokens (“SAFT”) with these accredited investors. The SAFT is an investment 
contract whereby investors purchase the right to receive tokens in the subsequent token 
network launch. In exchange, the company promises to deliver tokens upon the launch of 
the token network for the investors’ promise to pay immediately. Under US law, the SAFT 
is considered a security.31 
 
 
1.3  The crowdsale and distribution of tokens to the public 
 
After the token pre-sale, the company can start to build the network or develop the project 
described in its white paper. As of the date of this paper, no empirical studies have 
measured the rate of token pre-sales that successfully progress into a real project and 
what percentage results in an undeveloped idea jeopardising buyers’ interests. Therefore, 
completion or abandonment rates remain unclear and could be part of a future empirical 
study regarding ICOs. 
 
Once the network is developed, the company sells part of its tokens in exchange for 
cryptocurrencies. Generally, such cryptocurrencies would be Bitcoin or Ether. The 
crowdsale is the core of an ICO. It is the process of raising funds from all type of buyers or 
investors. Developing a network may sound easy. However, the risk of not developing a 
project is relatively high –even in the absence of fraud– considering that many of these 
projects promise to develop some kind of product or service on a blockchain. And the 
success of these projects could be complex to achieve due to the operational risks and 
scalability problems of blockchain technology.32  
 
For example, “The DAO”33 investigation proved that vulnerabilities in the code can be 
exploited by hackers to make funds disappear. The DAO was launched on 30th April, 2016, 
with a 28-day funding window. It proved popular, raising over $100m by 15th May, and by 
the end of the funding period, The DAO was the largest ICO at the time, having raised 
over $150m from more than 11,000 individuals. During the crowdsale, several people 
expressed concern that the code was vulnerable to attacks.34 A bug was exploited by a 
                                                          
30 Hendge Funds Investing Early in ICOs is Abusive: Cryptocurrency Investor. Altcoin Analysis (October, 2017) 
(available at: https://www.ccn.com/hedge-funds-investing-early-in-icos-is-abusive-cryptocurrency-investor/ ) 
31 This has been used only in pre-sales of non-security tokens. See Juan Batiz-Benet, Jesse Clayburgh and 
Marco Santori. The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant Token Sale Framework. Protocol Labs & Cooley LLP 
(2017) (available at: https://saftproject.com/static/SAFT-Project-White paper.pdf ) 
32 See Deloitte. Blockchain risk management – Risk functions need to play an active role in shaping blockchain 
strategy. (2017) (available at: https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/financial-
services/us-fsi-blockchain-risk-management.pdf)   
33 A DAO is a Decentralized Autonomous Organization. Its goal is to codify the rules and decision-making 
apparatus of an organization, eliminating the need for documents and people in governing, creating a structure 
with decentralized control. “The DAO” is the name of a particular DAO, conceived of and programmed by the 
team behind German startup Slock.it - a company building "smart locks" that let people share their things (cars, 
boats, apartments) in a decentralized version of Airbnb. 
34 See Understanding DAO hack. Coindesk (2017) (available at: https://www.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-
hack-journalists/)  
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hacker who took more than $3.6m worth of Ether by mid-June. Additionally, the price of 
Ether dropped from over $20 to under $13. This situation brought the project to an end.35 
To elaborate, ICOs tend to have a minimum threshold for funding – if this threshold is not 
met by the end of the funding period, the funds are usually returned to investors 
automatically in a process called “finalization”.36 In today’s ICOs, it is not clear what 
happens if the project is not developed and what is the enforcement mechanism for 
holding the developer accountable to the tokenholders. The degree of accountability also 
differs if the tokens are security tokens or non-security tokens. 
 
2. The cryptocurrencies received in return 
 
The cryptocurrencies accepted by issuers in an ICO are commonly-traded 
cryptocurrencies. Therefore, in exchange for issuing tokens, issuers usually receive 
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin or Ether. These commonly-traded cryptocurrencies may 
help companies to cash out the proceeds of the ICO. Typically, the issuer specifies in the 
white paper the type of cryptocurrencies accepted in exchange for the tokens. For 
example, if the blockchain network used to develop the issuer’s project is Ethereum, the 
issuer will likely require Ethers. 
 
This represents an enormous difference between ICOs and traditional methods to raise 
funds. The companies launching ICOs must make an analysis of the assumed price of the 
cryptocurrency received from tokenholders. The value of the cryptocurrency varies during 
the course of the ICO and the development of the project. This feature of ICOs mandates 
an analysis of the risks and problems companies might face when receiving a volatile 
asset to fund the development of a project. We will address this issue in Part VII. 
 
 
3. Blockchain: the technology behind Initial Coin Offerings  
 
Data has commonly been stored in centralised databases.37 A database is a structured 
collection of data that is stored on a computer, referred to as the server. Centralised 
databases are maintained by a central administrator and stored in a single server. This 
administrator is an intermediary that is trusted to maintain the data.38 In turn, users who 
want to access the stored data must send a request to the administrator’s server. While 
this centralized databased can reduce costs precisely due to centralization, this same 
                                                          
35 Alfonso Delgado et al, Towards a Sustainable ICO Process: Community Guidelines on Regulation and Best 
Practices (2016), pp. 26. 
36 Alfonso Delgado et al. Towards a Sustainable ICO Process: Community Guidelines on Regulation and Best 
Practices (2016), pp. 9. 
37 Sebastian Meunier, Blockchain technology – a very special kind of Distributed Database (2016).  
38 See Alfonso Delgado and Nydia Remolina, Foundations of Blockchain Technology, IIDF Working Paper 
Series (2019).  
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attribute makes it more vulnerable to single point of failure issues39 and to denial-of-service 
(“DoS”) attacks.40 
 
In contrast, a distributed database is a collection of multiple databases that are logically 
interrelated and distributed across a computer network.41 In these systems, the data can 
be replicated and stored in separate physical locations to prevent single point of failure 
issues and DoS attacks. However, distributed databases are costlier to maintain, due to 
higher storage, maintenance and labour costs. It is also challenging to preserve the 
integrity (i.e. correctness and consistency) of the data across the network.42 
 
In 2008, the world started to talk about blockchain technology43 which aims to enable data 
to be stored and maintained by network users themselves, without having to rely on any 
“trusted” third parties. In a broad sense, blockchain is used to describe the suite of 
technologies that allow computers in a peer-to-peer network to reach agreement over  
shared data.44 In a distributed peer-to-peer network, the participating computers are 
commonly referred to as nodes (or peers). Importantly, the tasks are not controlled or 
coordinated by a central node or an intermediating trusted party. Rather, these tasks are 
distributed across the nodes that record data into the network. This shared data record is 
composed of a series of entries that are linked to accounts from users and show every 
transaction that has been confirmed by the nodes. A protocol provides a set of rules and 
procedures that nodes must follow to share and verify the data.   
 
This 2008 idea was the base of the most famous case of blockchain technology usage: 
Bitcoin. From there, the blockchain hype became a reality and developers promised the 
world that blockchain would be disruptive, even stating that it could lead a revolution, 
similar to what the internet did for the world previously.45 Inspired by cryptocurrencies, 
startups in particular blockchain-based companies, realized that they could raise capital 
                                                          
39
 A single point of failure (SPOF) is a part of a system that, if it fails, will stop the entire system from working. 
SPOFs are undesirable in any system with a goal of high availability or reliability, be it a business practice, 
software application, or other industrial system. See Kevin Dooley, Designing Large Scale Lans: Help for 
Network Designers, O’REILLY MEDIA (2009), pp. 31. 
40 Where an external attacker temporarily prevents legitimate users from accessing the database by flooding 
the network with superfluous requests. See Alfonso Delgado and Nydia Remolina, Foundations of Blockchain 
Technology, IIDF Working Paper Series (2019). 
41 In distributed systems, not all storage devices are attached to a common processor. 
42 See Alfonso Delgado and Nydia Remolina, Foundations of Blockchain Technology. IIDF Working Paper 
Series (2019).  
43 In 2008 Satoshi Nakamoto, a pseudonym used by the inventor(s) of blockchain, published the Bitcoin paper 
and the source code on the Internet. In January 2009, New Liberty Standard opened the first Bitcoin trading 
platform. The initial exchange rate was 1,309.03 Bitcoin for one U.S. dollar. and in February 2010, the first 
payment in Bitcoin was processed at a price of 10,000 (more than $140 million at today’s exchange rate). The 
first large companies to accept Bitcoin were WordPress, Overstock.com, Zynga, and TigerDirect. See Satoshi 
Nakamoto, A Peer to Peer Electronic Cash System. (2008) Available at: https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf 
44 See Peter Van Valkenburgh, What is “Blockchain” Anyway (2017); Alfonso Delgado and Nydia Remolina, 
Foundations of Blockchain Technology, IIDF Working Paper Series (2019). 
45 Blockchain technology reduces the role of intermediaries by allowing people to transfer digital assets - 
property or data -, in a safe, secure, and immutable way, the technology can create: digital registries 
(cryptocurrencies) that are not backed by any central authority; self-enforcing smart contracts, decentralized 
marketplaces; decentralized communications platforms. See Aaron Wright and Primavera de Filippi. 
Decentralized  Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia. CYBERSPACE LAW E-JOURNAL (2015), 
(available at https://www.intgovforum.org/cms/wks2015/uploads/proposal_background_paper/SSRN-
id2580664.pdf) 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3182261 
12 
 
through issuing digital assets without intermediaries. Generally, the funds raised are used 
to build a new blockchain network, develop a decentralized application46 that runs on an 
existing blockchain network, or both.47   
 
This has evolved rapidly in the last couple of years. In 2013, Mastercoin launched the first 
ICO, which raised $5 million of Bitcoin equivalent.48 After 2013, blockchain technology 
became the need of funding from many blockchain-based project developers. Even though 
it all started as a fundraising mechanism used mostly among the blockchain and 
technology community to boost innovative ideas, investors and projects are turning 
becoming mainstream. Recent examples have even included celebrity promoters such as 
Paris Hilton (LydianCoin), ‘Ghostface Killah’ from the Wu Tang Clan (Cream Capital), 
Jamie Foxx (Cobinhood) and Floyd Mayweather Jr. (Stox).49 Furthermore, investors have 
become more interested in ICOs. These are not just investors with prior interest in 
techonology-related investments but also retail investors who want to diversify their 
portfolios and find ICOs an attractive speculative investment.50 Technology-based 
companies are not the only ones implementing blockchain. A broader set of companies 
desire to build networks or develop decentralized applications as well. These companies 
are using ICOs as a fundraising method as well.51 In 2017 and 2018, sectors such as 
finance, gaming, internet of things, cloud computing and even restaurants used ICOs as a 
fundraising method, in contrast with 2014 when ICOs where mainly used by core tech 
businesses.52  
 
4. The White Paper  
 
Developers of an ICO publish a document, known as a  “white paper”, that explains how 
the project is to be funded. A white paper is essentially a business plan. Most ICOs will 
allow potential investors – or actually any interested reader – to download their white 
paper off their official website. Some websites also serve as databases for the most recent 
                                                          
46 The dApp concept is still in its nascent stage. A decentralized application (dApp) is an application that runs 
on a P2P network of computers rather than a single computer. See https://hackernoon.com/what-are-
decentralized-applications-dapps-explained-with-examples-7ff8f2c4a460  
47 See Alfonso Delgado and Nydia Remolina, Foundations of Blockchain Technology, IIDF Working Paper 
Series (2019). 
48 Alfonso Delgado et al, Towards a Sustainable ICO Process: Community Guidelines on Regulation and Best 
Practices (2016). 
49 Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Douglas W. Arner and Linus Fôhr, The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a scam, It’s a 
bubble, It’s a super challenge for regulators. EUROPEAN BANKING INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES 2018 – NO. 18 
(2018) 
50 "Now we are seeing (…) that the latest ICOs are getting up to 80% of their funding from smaller buyers," 
says Daria Generalova, one of the founders of ICO Box in Vancouver. "The Bitcoin rate bleed can be 
considered as one of the underlying reasons for the upswing in token sales. Most of those tokens are paid for 
in bitcoin. But now that bitcoin is down, you will see investors holding onto it before they buy the smaller tokens 
in anticipation of a rate bounce." See Keneth Rapoza, Is It Too Late To Make Your Fortune In Cryptocurrency 
ICOs? FORBES (February 7, 2018) (available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2018/02/07/as-bitcoin-
struggles-will-investor-interest-in-icos-weaken/#3c812fd6433a)  
51 According to the hype cycle of blockchain technology, interest in blockchain continues unabated among 
enterprises in 2018 and it is expcted to reamin the same in 2019. Much of the focus is educational and 
experimental as executives struggle to understand concepts and applicability. Industries have made some 
progress, but maturity timelines are uncertain, and adoption at scale remains very scarce in a global context. 
See David Furlonger, Rajesh Kandaswamy. Hype Cycle for Blockchain Business. GARTNER INC. (2018) 
(available at: https://www.gartner.com/doc/3884146/hype-cycle-blockchain-business-) 
52 See https://next.autonomous.com/thoughts/jan-2018-ico-and-crypto-fund-numbers. 
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white papers published.53 White papers are also one of the first elements of a project 
investors should look at prior to deciding if it is a solid investment or an attractive asset to 
buy.54 
 
The first white paper, and clearly the one that was used as a model for ICOs, is Satoshi 
Nakamoto’s paper on Bitcoin. Since the structure of a white paper has not been regulated, 
market participants are starting to find a common ground on what should be the content of 
these documents. According to some empirical studies regarding ICOs and their white 
papers,55 there is one consistent characteristic among them: a technical description of the 
underlying technology for which funding is sought as well as some description of the 
potential use and benefits of said technology. Basically, it is a general description of the 
project to be executed and the benefits and disruption that project can bring to the table. 
 
ICO white papers may present certain issues. On the one hand, the paper may provide 
misleading information. For example, it can state that a token is not a security when it is, or 
it cannot stay the appropriate applicable law.56 On the other hand, promoters may omit 
some relevant information they may disclose only those aspects that can be benefitial to 
them at the expense of the purchasers of tokens.57  
 
These asymmetries of information might be corrected by either setting out which elements 
should be included as a minimum in the white papers by an overarching body, or letting 
                                                          
53 For example http://white paperdatabase.com/  
54 As we will see in following sections, not all tokens are investments. For example, some of them only grant 
access to a platform or a discount. These tokens should not be considered necessarily as an investment 
contract.   
55 Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Douglas W. Arner and Linus Fôhr, The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a scam, It’s a 
bubble, It’s a super challenge for regulators, EUROPEAN BANKING INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES 2018 – NO. 18 
(2018). 
56 Only 31% of the ICOs in a sample of 450 ICOs mention the law applicable to the ICO. In 37.7% of the cases 
the white paper excluded investors from certain countries from participation. In 86.5% of the cases there is no 
information at all as to the regulatory status of the ICO. This also included cavalier disregard of the need to 
inform a participant as to where precisely their funds are going. See Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, 
Douglas W. Arner and Linus Fôhr, The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a scam, It’s a bubble, It’s a super challenge for 
regulators, EUROPEAN BANKING INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES 2018 – NO. 18 (2018). 
57 The risks of selective disclosure and the benefits associated with harmonization and comparability may  
justify mandatory disclosure in capital markets. For a discussion on this issue, see Armour et al, PRINCIPLES OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 164-167; Luca Enriques and Sergio Gilotta, 
Disclosure and Financial Market Regulation, in Eilis Ferran, Niamh Moloney and Jennifer Payne (eds)., THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK ON FINANCIAL REGULATION (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 511-25; Merrit Fox, Retaining 
Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is not Investor Empowerment, 85 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 
1335 (1999); Zohar Goshen and Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation 55 DUKE 
LAW JOURNAL 711 (2006). Pointing out the benefits of standardization in some particular rules (e.g., 
accounting), see John Armour et at, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 19. Likewise, using Akerlof´s seminal work about asymmetries 
of information, it can be argued that the lack of enough information about all issuers may lead to an adverse 
selection problem: investors will not be able to distinguish “good” and “bad” issuers. Therefore, they might be 
reluctant to provide finance, or they will do so at a higher cost for everyone, considering that, in the absence of 
mandatory (and standardized) disclosure, many “bad issuers” may decide to provide just “selective disclosure” 
of what it can be only in their interest. For a general analysis of this problem, see George A. Akerlof, The 
Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMICS 488 (1970). In the context of ICOs, Professor Chris Brummer has advocated for standardizing 
disclosure in white papers. See https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/congressional-hearings-we-must-
distinguish-digital-commodities-icos/  
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markets decide the best way to guarantee a certain degree of standardization, for example 
using analysts or law firms as advisors in structuring ICOs or through peer reviews.58 
Companies might also engage in public discourse, defending the white paper and even 
advertising an upcoming token sale. As a result of this marketing, advertising and public 
discourse, some pre-sales could make many tokens meet the definition of ‘security’ under 
some countries’ securities laws.59 
 
When the white paper is first published, usually developers have little more than the 
description of what they want to achieve after the ICO. However, in some white papers, 
part of the code is published. Thus, the tokens offered in this stage are not functional for 
using the platforms. Even though those tokens cannot be utilized, they can still be traded 
during pre-sales of tokens.  
 
5. Differences between ICOs and other methods to raise capital  
 
ICOs present some similarities with other financing methods, such as venture capital, 
angel investment, initial public offerings and especially crowdfunding. Actually, ICOs are 
sometimes considered as an application of the crowdfunding mechanism to blockchain-
based companies or projects.60 Since there are no empirical studies determing why 
companies may prefer ICOs over other fundraising methods, we will try to describe the 
main differences and similarities between these methods from a functional, finance and 
regulatory perspective. Thus, it will be easier to identify those aspects that make an ICO a 
more or less attractive method to raise capital.  
 
Table 1. Differences and Similarities between ICOs and other sources of financing 
 
 IPO Crowdfunding Venture Capital ICO 
Level of 
regulatory 
compliance  
IPOs are heavily 
regulated in all 
jurisdictions by 
securities 
regulations. This 
process often 
requires the 
intervention of an 
underwriter (one or 
more investment 
banks) and law 
firms.  
Crowdfunding is not 
regulated in most 
jurisdictions. However, 
in the US, UK and 
some continental 
European countries, it 
is already regulated. 
(e.g. US regulations of 
crowdfunding have 
been in place since 
2012). Some countries 
in Latin America 
enacted primary 
legislation regarding 
crowdfunding in recent 
years as well (i.e. 
Mexico, Argentina, 
Venture capital funds 
are subject to   the 
same basic 
regulations as other 
forms of private 
securities 
investments.  
 
Additionally, private 
equity firms often 
have to register with 
securities regulators 
and are subject to 
some reporting 
requirements.  
ICOs are regulated 
in some 
jurisdictions. Only 
those considered 
securities are 
subject to securities 
regulations.61 
 
There are almost no 
barriers to entry for 
those who wish to 
conduct an ICO 
(especially if the 
token is a non-
security token). 
Some basic coding 
skills to generate 
                                                          
58 Some advisors and law firms are specialized now in review ICO papers, and some of them are “certified” by 
a peer review.  
59 The SAFT transaction might rely on Rule 506(c) of the Securities Act (United States federal securities 
regulation) which allows for general solicitation of investors, but requires that the offering must be limited, in the 
end, only to verified accredited investors. 
60 Alfonso Delgado et al, Towards a Sustainable ICO Process: Community Guidelines on Regulation and Best 
Practices (2016). 
61 We will describe the different regulatory approaches in Section II. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3182261 
15 
 
Colombia).  tokens is the only 
entry barrier62. 
 
Limits /caps No limits. In almost all 
jurisdictions, 
crowdfunding is 
capped at certain 
amounts.  
No limits in investing 
but the venture 
capital funds have a 
fixed life. 
No limits. 
“Investors” Institutional 
investors and retail 
investors 
participate in the 
distribution of 
securities through 
IPOs. 
Funds raised from 
members of the public, 
many of whom are not 
professional / 
institutional investors. 
However, 
crowdfunding 
campaigns 
generally take place 
through an 
intermediating platform 
that extracts fees from 
issuers 
A venture capitalist 
is a person who 
makes venture 
investments and 
these venture 
capitalists are 
expected to bring 
managerial and 
technical expertise 
as well as capital to 
their investments. 
Venture capital  
funds are typically 
managed by a 
venture capital firm, 
which often employs 
individuals with 
technology 
backgrounds 
(scientists, 
researchers), 
business training 
and/or deep industry 
experience. 
None of the 
regulatory 
approaches so far 
have limited ICOs.63 
It follows that 
current investors 
would refer to  
institutional 
investors and retail 
investors. 
Disclosure 
requirements 
IPOs require the 
preparation of a 
prospectus, which 
structure and 
content is highly 
regulated.  
 
Companies issuing 
equity (or 
debt) via crowdfunding 
platforms are required 
to 
disclose essential 
information 
to investors 
Venture capital funds 
are accountable to 
their own investors. 
This provides an 
incentive to screen 
and monitor 
investments carefully 
The content of a 
white paper is not 
regulated.  
Secondary 
market of the 
instruments 
issued 
The securities will 
have a secondary 
market which is 
determined in the 
prospectus. The 
securities, when 
issued, are 
registered in a 
stock exchange.  
Securities are 
privately-held and, 
generally,  
there is no secondary 
market to trade them 
These funds have a 
fixed term. 
Depending on the 
structure of the 
token, some will 
have a secondary 
market. This feature 
could mean in some 
jurisdictions that the 
token is a security.  
Pricing  IPOs have 
different 
mechanisms for 
pricing: Fixed 
price, Dutch 
auction, 
The platform is 
responsible for the 
valuation and pricing of 
the projects in almost 
all jurisdictions. The 
platforms is a 
In return for 
financing one to two 
years of a 
company’s start-up, 
venture capitalists 
expect a ten times 
Price comes from 
issuer and it is 
subjective.  
 
The ICO mechanism 
allows 
                                                          
62 The Ethereum’s introductory tutorial teaches this basic coding skills. See Alfonso Delgado et al, Towards a 
Sustainable ICO Process: Community Guidelines on Regulation and Best Practices (2016) 
63 This statement excludes jurisdictions that have prohibited ICOs, such as China.  
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Bookbuilding 
(which is the most 
common method)  
supervised entity. return of capital over 
five years.64 
entrepreneurs to 
generate buyer 
competition for the 
token, which, in turn, 
reveals consumer 
value without the 
entrepreneurs 
having to know, ex 
ante, consumer’s 
willingness to pay. 
What is being 
sold 
Generally shares 
(equity)  
Generally securities 
that can be classified 
as equity (equity 
crowdfunding) or debt 
(crowdlending). 
Generally shares 
(equity)  
Coins or tokens, 
which can be 
classified as 
securities or non-
security tokens, and 
equity or debt, 
depending on the 
features of the 
token. 
Accountability Issuers, law firms 
and underwritters  
in an IPO may be 
liable for 
misrepresentations 
or omissions in a 
prospectus. 
The funding portals or 
platforms are subject 
to registration and 
supervision from the 
securities market 
authorities.  
Venture capital funds 
are accountable to 
their own investors. 
This provides an 
incentive to screen 
and monitor 
investments 
carefully. 
ICOs can be 
securities offerings 
and they may need 
to be registered.  
 
Source: Alfonso Delgado et al (2016) and authors’ elaboration  
 
Despite these similarities and substantially different regulatory approaches to ICOs among 
jurisdictions, which makes the comparison harder, the ICO market was 40% of the size of 
the IPO market and 30% the size of the venture capital market during the first quarter of 
2018.65 The size of this phenomenon has perked the interest of regulators. The following 
section analyzes how different jurisdictions and regulators are coping with ICOs and 
provides a new safe but efficient system to deal with this method to raise funds.  
 
II. Regulatory approaches to deal with ICOs 
 
Regulators around the world approach ICOs very differently.66 For example, some 
countries, such as China67 and South Korea,68 have opted to prohibit ICOs. In other 
jurisdictions, including the United States,69 Singapore,70 and Switzerland,71 tokens are 
                                                          
64 Bob Zider. How Venture Capital Works. HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW. (1998) (available at: 
https://hbr.org/1998/11/how-venture-capital-works) 
65 Caitlin Long. 6 Facts Institutional Investors Should Know about Crypto. (April, 2018). https://caitlin-
long.com/2018/04/24/6-facts-institutional-investors-should-know-about-crypto/  
66 For an analysis of the statements issued by many securities regulator about ICOs, and how some of them 
plan to deal with ICOs, see https://www.iosco.org/publications/?subsection=ico-statements  
67 The details of this prohibition can be found in several sources. For instance, see  
https://www.ft.com/content/3fa8f60a-9156-11e7-a9e6-11d2f0ebb7f0  
68 Analyzing the recent ban of South Korea, see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-bitcoin/south-
korea-bans-raising-money-through-initial-coin-offerings-idUSKCN1C408N  
69  The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission´s statements on ICOs can be found here: 
https://www.sec.gov/ICO  
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allowed. However, issuers need to comply with existing securities laws if the token is 
classified as a ‘security’ under the relevant country’s securities law. Finally, in other 
countries like Mexico,72 any issuance of tokens have to be authorized by the regulator. 
Therefore, regardless whether they are security or non-security tokens, the issuer must 
attain the approval of the regulator before proceeding with any issuance of tokens.  
 
As it will be discussed, all of the existing regulatory approaches present some flaws. For 
this reason, we will propose a new model to regulate ICOs that, while facilitating the use of 
ICOs as a source of finance, seeks to (ii) enhance the protection of the purchasers of 
tokens; and (iii) create a safe, fair and efficient regulatory environment. 
 
1. Existing regulatory approaches 
 
1.1.  Contractual Approach 
 
One possible approach may consist of excluding tokens from the scope of securities 
regulation. Under this approach, any issuance of tokens –and the terms provided in the 
white papers– would be exclusively subject to the law of contracts. In countries with a 
definition of ‘securities’ based on a closed catalogue of financial products (e.g., shares or 
bonds), as it is the case in Singapore, this approach will be easily achieved. The regulator 
should not need to enact new legislation. If things remain status quo, all issuances of 
tokens would be excluded from securities law, unless the token can be classified as a 
share, bond or other product included in the definition of security.73  
 
By contrast, in countries with a functional concept of securities, as it happens in the United 
States, where the economic substance prevails over the legal form, an adoption of this 
model may require action by the regulators. Namely, it may force the regulator to enact 
legislation prescribing that even if a token meets the requirements to be deemed a 
security, it will not be subject to securities regulation. This regulatory approach would 
specifically exclude tokens from securities laws. As a result, ICOs would be exclusively 
governed by the law of contracts.  
 
This contractual model may reduce regulatory costs associated with an issuance of 
tokens. Therefore, it can make ICOs a more attractive method to raise capital. However, it 
would create several problems. First, this approach would not provide a level playing field. 
By allowing functionally similar products to be subject to different regulatory frameworks, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
70 The Monetary Authority of Singapore´s statement on ICOs can be found here: http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-
and-Publications/Monographs-and-Information-Papers/2017/Guidance-on-Digital-Token-Offerings.aspx). 
71 The Swiss securities regulator has provided a coherent and thoughtful guidance on ICOs: 
https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2018/02/20180216-mm-ico-wegleitung/  
72 See Mexico Fintech Law (In Spanish: Ley para regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera). Available 
at: http://www.senado.gob.mx/sgsp/gaceta/63/3/2017-10-12-
1/assets/documentos/Iniciativa_Ejecitvo_Federal.pdf  
73 While this is very unlikely in most jurisdictions, where shares or bonds are defined in a more formal way 
rather than on a functional basis, this scenario can be possible under Singapore law. See Monetary Authority 
of Singapore, A Guide to Digital Token Offerings (2018), pp. 3 allowing tokens to be considered “shares” when 
it confers or represents ownership interest in a corporation. Therefore, if a token confers or represent 
ownership interest in a corporation, can be considered a “share”. And if so, it will be a security.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3182261 
18 
 
the regulator would unfairly discriminate those products subject to securities laws. Since 
these latter products would be subject to a higher regulatory burden, the regulatory costs 
borne by an issuer of tokens would be lower, even when, from a functional perspective, 
they offer a similar product. Moreover, in countries in which the concept of security is 
defined from a functional perspective, this approach would also be inconsistent with the 
definition of security. Therefore, the adoption of this model would also require a 
modification of the concept of security.  
 
Second, this approach would also be riskier for investors in several ways. On the one 
hand, since no mandatory disclosure would be required, the issuer would be free to select 
the amount of information provided to investors and how this information is disclosed. 
Therefore, the issuer can take advantage of this situation to include obscure terms and 
omit some relevant information. On the other hand, the lack of mandatory disclosure would 
also make harder the comparison of ICOs. Therefore, it will be more difficult (or at least 
costlier) to identify credible, value-creating projects providing a greater level of protection 
to the purchasers of tokens. Finally, by excluding these products from the scope of 
securities regulation, the purchasers of token would not be protected by the securities 
supervisor. Therefore, unless the power to protect consumers by overseeing the terms of 
the white papers are transferred to another regulatory agency (for example, a Consumer 
Protection Bureau), the level of protection to the purchasers of tokens will be significantly 
reduced. And it will be reduced not only for the higher asymmetries of information 
potentially created between issuers and tokenholders, but also for the higher risk of fraud, 
or at least opportunism, existing in a world in which the issuer knows, from an ex ante 
perspective, that the issuance and terms associated with the ICO will not be subject to the 
supervision of any regulatory authority.  
 
1.2. Bans 
 
Another regulatory approach may consist of banning ICOs. This prohibition may take 
several forms. First, the regulator may decide to prohibit any type of ICO, as it happens in 
China and South Korea. This prohibition may be due to several factors. For example, the 
regulator may consider that the risks associated with this new source of finance (especially 
in terms of fraud, money laundering and opportunistic behavior over naïve consumers) 
exceed its benefits. Therefore, it does not make sense to promote this fundraising method, 
at least while the regulator does not come up with an appropriate regulatory framework to 
deal with the risks of ICOs. Likewise, the use of ICOs may also have adverse effects for a 
country´s economic and monetary policy. After all, an issuance of tokens not only involves 
companies raising cryptocurrencies rather than official currencies, but also that  
purchasers of those tokens have previously acquired cryptocurrencies in order to be 
allowed to participate in the ICO. Therefore, the amount of official currencies might be 
significantly reduced, while the investment and consumption in the country may increase 
or at least remain stable. As a result, the Government may lose control over some relevant 
factors that may affect the economy and monetary policy of the country.  
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Second, regulators may decide to prohibit ICOs for certain constituencies. For instance, 
the regulator may decide to prohibit retail consumers to be involved in an ICO due to the 
fact that, as a result of the higher asymmetries of information that they face, they might be 
more exposed to the promoters´ opportunism. Likewise, the regulator may also ban 
commercial banks and some institutional investors from purchasing tokens. After all, not 
only they manage other people´s money, but several reasons mainly associated with 
systemic risk seem to recommend a more risk-averse investment policy in these entities. 
And the purchase of tokens is highly risky.  
 
Finally, the regulator may decide to ban the purchase of tokens upon the reaching of 
certain limits. In other words, it can impose limitations in the amount of tokens potentially 
acquired by certain purchasers, as it seems to be the approach followed in Russia.74 By 
implementing this restriction, the regulator would limit the potential losses that 
tokenholders may lose in case of being involved in a fraudulent or just unsuccessful ICO. 
 
In our view, while the reasons to ban the purchase and issuance of ICOs may seem 
plausible (especially taking into account that more than 80% of ICOs are scams75), this 
policy followed in China and South Korea may prevent many firms and early-stage 
ventures from receiving finance to develop their projects. Moreover, if the primary 
concerns of the regulator have to do with the risk of fraudulent behavior and the economic 
and monetary consequences of the risk of ICOs, there are more efficient ways to deal with 
these issues, as will be discussed in our proposal to create a safe regulatory framework for 
ICOs. As for the limitation in the amount of tokens potentially acquired by a single 
purchaser, we believe that it just solves part of the problem. Namely, it reduces the 
individual losses potentially borne by a failed (or even fraudulent) ICO. However, it does 
not generate any benefit from an aggregate or social-welfare perspective. Issuers can still 
take advantage of the asymmetries of information faced by consumers, and some 
fraudulent behavior can be committed. For this reason, we do not find this proposal 
entirely convincing. In the case of restricting the purchase of tokens to certain actors, for 
example, the situation might be different. In the context of individuals, we believe that 
regulators should not ban the purchase of tokens by individuals. Instead, they should 
invest resources in warning investors, through advertisement and education, about the 
risks of ICOs. Thus, the regulator would be able to preserve individuals’ freedom to 
purchase tokens while minimizing the risks of being ripped off. For commercial banks and 
institutional investors, however, we do believe that some bans should be imposed. For this 
reason, certain limitations for these special market participants will be imposed in our 
proposal to deal with ICOs, discussed in section 2 below.   
 
 
1.3. Security Token Registration 
 
Many jurisdictions around the world, including the United States, Switzerland, and 
Singapore, subject the issuance of security tokens to general securities laws. Therefore, if 
                                                          
74 See http://bitcoinist.com/russia-unveils-ico-regulations-ruble/ 
75 See https://cointelegraph.com/news/new-study-says-80-percent-of-icos-conducted-in-2017-were-scams  
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a token is not classified as a security, the issuance of tokens will be exclusively governed 
by the law of contract. By contrast, if the token is deemed to be a security, the issuance of 
tokens will be subject to securities law. Therefore, it will be subject to the general rules 
governing the preparation and registration of prospectus, as well as the supervision of the 
securities regulator. Likewise, if certain requirements are met, the issuer might enjoy the 
exemptions generally provided by securities regulators to certain issuances of securities.76 
Therefore, even though it will be subject to the oversight of the securities regulator, it may 
be waived from the costly procedures generally associated with the preparation and 
registration of prospectus.  
 
In our opinion, this model has various advantages. First, it provides a level playing field by 
not discriminating among functionally similar products. Therefore, regardless of their legal 
form, products with similar features and functions will be subject to the same rules of the 
game. Second, by subjecting the issuance of security tokens to securities regulation, the 
regulator will provide a greater level of protection to the purchasers of security tokens. 
Finally, the lack of regulation of non-security tokens may reduce the regulatory burden of 
some tokens that, due to their particular features, might not need the same level of 
protection existing in security tokens. Therefore, by reducing the regulatory costs 
associated with the issuance of these tokens, regulators may facilitate fundraising to many 
ventures that may have trouble getting access to other sources of finance.  
 
Despite the general benefits associated with this regulatory model, we do not find it 
entirely convincing. On the one hand, it is not clear whether the general framework existing 
in securities law will be enough to protect security tokenholders. Indeed, even though, from 
a functional perspective, some tokens can look like securities, the issuance of tokens 
presents other particular features that cannot be found in other types of securities. First, 
unlike what happens with shareholders, tokenholders are not protected by corporate law.  
Second, in the context of ICOs, there is no market for corporate control to discipline 
managers. That is, the promoter of the ICO cannot be subject to any hostile takeovers and 
ultimately be removed from its position. Therefore, the potential situation of opportunism of 
issuers vis-à-vis investors will be higher in the context of ICOs, since the promoter will 
unlikely face the risk of being removed for a poor governance or performance, as it may 
happen in equity markets. Third, while equity markets can be relatively efficient, in the 
sense that they reflect all publicly available information, the same cannot be applied to 
                                                          
76 For a general view of exemptions, see John Armour et al, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION (Oxford 
University Press, 2016), pp. 167-173. For a US perspective, see John Coffee, Jr. and Hillary A. Sale, 
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (Foundation Press, 12th Edition, 2012), 328-407. In the 
European Union, see the Regulation No 2017/1129  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  
the  prospectus  to  be  published  when  securities  are  offered  to  the  public or admitted to trading on a 
regulated market. This regulation repealed the Directive 2003/71/EC which governed the offer of securities in 
the European Union since 2005. In Singapore, an offer  may be  exempt  from  the Prospectus  Requirements 
where, amongst others, the offer is a small offer of securities of an entity, or units in a CIS, that does not 
exceed S$5 million (or  its  equivalent  in  a  foreign  currency) within any 12-month period, subject to certain 
conditions; the offer is a private placement offer made to no more than 50 persons  within any 12-month 
period, subject to certain conditions; the offer is made to institutional investors only; or the offer is made to 
accredited investors, subject to certain conditions. See Monetary Authority of Singapore, A guide to digital 
token offerings (2018), pp. 5-6. Similar requirements apply in other jurisdictions.  
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market of tokens. In these latter markets, the lack of a deep secondary market (or even the 
existence of a secondary market) as well the smaller number of analysts and investors will 
make very unlikely that the price of a token reflects all publicly available information. As a 
result, tokenholders will find it more difficult to know the intrinsic value of their assets, and 
this lack of information may distort their ability to make wise financial decision. Fourth, 
tokenholders probably face more asymmetries of information than a regular shareholder in 
a public company. This is due not only to the complexity of the white project or the project 
behind the ICO, but more importantly to the inability of the market to project retail 
investors, as it has been mentioned in above. Finally, the cryptocurrency world seems to 
be involved in a ‘hype’ that may exacerbate the ability of many tokenholders to make 
thoughtful decisions. Therefore, the risk of making wrong the decisions will be higher in the 
context of ICOs. As a result, perhaps the general rules governing securities law might not 
be enough to protect investors, and some further steps should be taken by the regulators.  
 
On the other hand, even if it were assumed that the regulatory approach existing in 
jurisdictions like the United States, Switzerland and Singapore provides a reasonable level 
of protection to security tokenholders, there are still two additional regulatory challenges to 
be addressed: (i) the protection of non-security tokenholders; and (ii) making sure that all 
security tokens comply with securities laws.  
 
In our opinion, these jurisdictions fail to protect non-security tokens. Indeed, while many 
steps have been taken to protect security tokenholders, regulators have not seriously 
thought about the protection of non-security tokenholders. This lack of protection is 
probably due to the fact that most of the discussion of ICOs has been generated in the 
capital market  space, and the protection of non-security tokens probably exceeds the 
scope of securities regulators. Therefore, perhaps this discussion should be led by other 
regulatory authorities. Likewise, we also believe that the regulatory model existing in these 
countries fail to avoid the problem associated with not subjecting security tokens to 
securities regulation. On the one hand, the issuer may have perverse incentives to avoid 
the regulatory burden associated with securities regulation. For this reason, it may classify 
its tokens as non-security tokens even when they meet all the requirements to be 
classified as securities. In our opinion, even though this problem will be reduced in 
countries with an active enforcement department and severe sanctions imposed to those 
issuers failing to comply with securities laws, the deterrence effect created by getting 
caught and sanctioned might not be enough to prevent misbehavior – especially in a 
sector where more than 80% of the issuances are scams. Moreover, even if the issuer is 
caught, it will be difficult to repair the damage to both investors and the market as a whole. 
 
In addition, there will be circumstances in which it is not clear whether a particular token 
should be classified as a security, as shown in the United States by cases such as SEC v 
Howey, Munchee, or Reves v Ernst & Young. 77 Moreover, many issuers might fail to 
comply with existing securities law even in good faith.  
                                                          
77 These cases were decided in the United States. For the concept of “security” in the United States, see John 
Coffee, Jr. and Hillary A. Sale, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (Foundation Press, 12th Edition, 
2012), 246-327; Hal S. Scott and Anna Gerlpern, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY AND 
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In our opinion, the regulatory model existing in the United States, Switzerland, and 
Singapore makes it particularly difficult to investigate an ICO if the promoter has not 
submitted any files or prospectus to the securities regulators. In these situations, the 
securities regulators will likely hear about the ICO from others, sometimes when 
something bad has already happened. For this reason, we believe that a system of ex ante 
control might be needed in these countries. Namely, it will be proposed in section 2 that 
any issuance of tokens, no matter whether they are security tokens or non-security tokens, 
should be disclosed to the security regulators or any other public regulatory agency. Thus, 
by making it easier to the regulator to facilitate the investigation of all issuance of tokens, 
issuers will think twice how to classify their tokens and, if so, whether complying with 
securities regulation.  
 
1.4. Comprehensive Token Registration 
 
Other countries, such as Mexico, have opted for imposing a system of full control ex ante 
over all issuances of tokens.78 According to this approach, any issuance of tokens should 
be registered and authorized by the regulator.79 Then, depending of the type of tokens, 
existing securities laws may apply or not. Thus while a security token will be subject to the 
full gamut of disclosure and procedural requirements and obligations existing in securities 
law, the regulatory burden for an issuance of non-security tokens will be notably reduced.80  
 
The Mexican solution solves the problem associated with not having control over the 
issuance of non-security tokens, or even security tokens not registered before the 
securities regulator. Therefore, it may fix part of the flaws of the regulatory model existing 
in the United States, Switzerland and Singapore. Nevertheless, the solution adopted by 
Mexico is far from perfect. Among other aspects, it imposes more costs for issuers and 
regulators. From the perspective of the issuers, the issuance of tokens will probably 
involve more time and money. From the perspective of the regulator, this model would 
require more people to be trained and hired to monitor, analyze, classify and approve the 
issuance of tokens. Therefore, it will be costlier. And while this investment in hiring and 
training people to deal with ICOs may be valuable in some cases, there will be many 
situations in which it is not worth it (e.g., when a token consists of just a redeemable 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
REGULATION (Foundation Press, 21st edition, 2016). For a comparison between the United States and Europe, 
see Philipp Hacker and Dr. Chris Thomale, Crypto-securities regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and 
Cryptocurrencies under EU Financial Law, 17-36. For the concept of security in Singapore, for example, see 
Hans Tjio, Wan Wai Yee, and Yee Know Hon, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SECURITIES REGULATIONS IN 
SINGAPORE (LexisNexis, 3rd Edition, 2017). For an analysis of the concept of securities in the United Kingdom, 
Australia, South Africa and India, see Frederick H. C. Mazando, The Taxonomy of Global Securities: is the U. 
S. Definition of a Security too Broad? NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS 121, 148-176. 
78 However, Mexico’s Fintech law only mentions “digital assets”. It does not refer to ICOs or tokens. 
Nonetheless, “digital assets” is broader enough to consider tokens and ICOs subject to Mexican Fintech law 
according to our interpretation.  
79 Interestingly, in Mexico, the issuance of tokens does not have to be authorized by the securities regulator 
but by the Central Bank.  
80 It is not clear how the Mexican approach will operate in practice. While writing this article, Mexico has just 
enacted a Fintech Law saying that any issuance of “cryptocurrencies” will be subject to the authorization of the 
regulator.  
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voucher in a company). As a result, even though the Mexican approach solves part of the 
problems existing in other regulatory models, it creates other costs. For this reason, it does 
not sound entirely convincing either.  
 
2. Toward a safe but efficient system to deal with ICOs 
 
As it has been mentioned previously, all the existing regulatory models to deal with ICOs 
present some flaws. For this reason, we propose a new model that, while protecting 
tokenholders, market integrity, market supervision, and the stability of the financial system, 
can still facilitate the use of ICOs as an affordable method to raise finance. Our proposal is 
built on four core pillars.  
 
First, all issuance of tokens, no matter whether they are security or non-security tokens, 
should be disclosed to the regulator. The way to do so may consist of requiring issuers to 
submit a simple, harmonized electronic form to the securities regulator or any other public 
authority.81 This electronic form should contain some basic information about the issuance. 
This basic information may include the promoter´s location, problem and proposed 
technology solution, description of the token, blockchain governance, qualifications of the 
technical team, and risk factors.82 Likewise, we also believe that the form should include 
other factors potentially relevant for the purchasers of tokens, including identity of the 
promoters, legal advisors, accounting and finance aspects of the ICO, and any legal or 
contractual provisions available to protect tokenholders.  
 
By submitting this electronic form, not only the regulator will be in a better position to 
monitor any issuance of tokens, but it will also be easier for analysts and investors to 
compare ICOs since issuers will be required to provide a minimum level of standardized 
information. Therefore, this comparability could serve as an additional tool to protect 
tokenholders, while facilitating to the regulatory authorities the analysis of the information 
provided by the ICO´s promoter. As a result, this higher scrunity will incentivize promoters 
to behave in a more honest and diligent manner, since this regulatory model will maker 
easier for regulators to investigate and, if so, sanction any fraudulent ICOs, as well as 
those issuances of securities tokens –sometimes publicized as non-security tokens– failing 
to comply with securities laws.  
 
Second, as non-security tokenholders are not protected under securities law, we believe 
that several strategies should be implemented to protect these purchasers. Namely, we 
argue that regulators should protect non-security tokenholders by implementing some 
regulatory strategies existing to protect consumers and financial consumers. As it will be 
discussed in section V, these strategies will include cooling off periods, the prohibition of 
certain terms and products, the imposition of conduct obligations on the issuer, and the 
                                                          
81 Moreover, companies required to prepare and submit financial statements should be required to mentioned 
any issuance of tokens in the notes to the financial statements. 
82 This basic information has been suggested for white papers. See Chris Brummer, What should be in an ICO 
white paper? (available at https://cointelegraph.com/news/what-should-be-in-an-ico-white-paper-expert-take). 
For a deeper analysis, see Chris Brummer, Trevor Kiviat, and Jai R. Massari, What Should Be Disclosed in an 
Initial Coin Offering? (2018) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3293311).  
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use of certain litigation rules to favor the non-security tokenholder in case of a potential 
lawsuit.  
 
Third, being involved in a pre-sale of tokens is even riskier than participating in other types 
of ICOs since the tokenholder will be entitled to something that does not exist yet – and 
based on the number of scams, it seems quite probable that it might not exist ever. 
Therefore, we believe that commercial banks and pension funds should not be allowed to 
purchase these tokens since they invest money from the general public and their potential 
failure could have severe consequences for the stability of the financial system.83 
Therefore, they should not engage in this type of risky activities.  
 
Fourth, several factors make the purchase of tokens particularly risky, including the high 
probability of scams, the lack of effective devices to protect tokenholders, the larger 
asymmetries of information between founders and tokenholders, and the high risk of 
irrational behavior that might take place in the crypto markets.84 For this reason, we 
believe that the regulator should spend more resources and efforts in warning retail 
tokenholders about the risks associated with the purchase of tokens.  
 
III. Accounting and finance aspects of ICOs 
 
Another critical aspect raised by the issuance of tokens concerns the accounting and 
finance aspects of ICOs. In other methods to raise capital, it seems relatively clear, from 
an accounting and finance perspective, what a company gives to investors, and what the 
issuer receives in return. For example, in an IPO, a company gives shares (equity) to 
public investors, and it receives cash in return. In a debenture, a company gives bonds 
(debt) in exchange for cash. Moreover, in this type of transactions, the way the company´s 
counterparty is classified from an accounting and finance perspective is also relatively 
clear. In an issuance of shares, the company´s counterparties are equityholders. 
Therefore, they will be part of the company´s net assets (or equity) within the balance-
sheet. In an issuance of bonds, the company´s counterparties are debtholders. Hence, 
they will be part of the company´s liabilities.  
 
 
        Table 2. Registration of tokens from an accounting´s perspective 
 
Issuer’s balance-sheet 
                                                          
83 Due to the size and the particular features of these institutions, their failure may generate various negative 
externalities, including lack of confidence, contagion, connectedness and more generally systemic risk. For an 
analysis of these concepts, see Hal Scott Hal S. Scott, CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION: PROTECTING THE 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM PANICS (MIT Press, 2016); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEORGETOWN LAW 
JOURNAL 193 (2008); Viral Acharya, A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation, 6 
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STABILITY 224 (2009). For an analysis of the importance of pension funds and other 
institutional investors in capital markets, see Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of 
Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and The Revaluation of Governance Rights, 863 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 
928 (2013). 
84 See Alfonso Delgado et al, Towards a Sustainable ICO Process: Community Guidelines on Regulation and 
Best Practices (2016), pp. 26-28. 
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Cryptocurrencies (assets) Tokens (Debt/Equity) 
  Tokenholder’s balance-sheet  
Tokens (assets)  Cryptocurrencies (assets) 
 
 
The classification of the company’s counterparty from an accounting and finance 
perspective may have different implications. For example, it may affect the company´s 
governance and cost of capital, and more importantly from a legal perspective, the 
company´s financial ratios and covenants.85 Indeed, since some of the contractual terms 
potentially agreed between issuers and lenders may specify that the company should 
maintain certain debt/equity ratios, or even certain levels of current versus non-current 
liabilities, the classification of an issuance of tokens as debt or equity, or as current 
liabilities or non-current liabilities, may ultimately affect the company’s existing loan 
agreements. Therefore, it seems particularly relevant to analyze the anatomy of an ICO 
from an accounting and finance perspective.  
 
As it has been mentioned in previous sections, a promoter issues tokens and it receives 
cryptocurrencies in return. Therefore, since the cryptocurrencies will represent a right for 
the company, they will be registered as an asset in the company’s balance-sheet. As a 
general rule, they will represent a current asset, due to the ability of most cryptocurrencies 
to be converted into cash in a short period of time.  
 
More problems arise when we analyze the registration of the issuance of tokens. In this 
case, the tokens issued by the company can be classified as equity or debt. In our opinion, 
this classification will depend on the features of the tokens. When the white paper gives 
tokenholders economic and political rights similar to those held by shareholders, the 
tokenholders should be classified, at least from an accounting and finance perspective, as 
equityholders. Therefore, the issuance of tokens will be registered in the company’s net 
assets (equity). By contrast, in those cases in which the features of the token seem to 
reflect that the tokenholders will entitled to future services or fixed payments, those 
tokenholders should be classified as debtholders. Therefore, they will be part of the 
company´s liabilities. And depending on the maturity of those rights held by tokenholders, 
the issuance of tokens will be registered as non-current liabilities (if the maturity is more 
than a year) or current liabilities (if the maturity is less or equal than a year).  
                                                          
85 For a pioneer study about the impact of the capital structure on the value of the firm, see Franco Modigliani 
and Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and The Theory of Investment, 48 THE AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC REVIEW 261 (1958). These authors establish that the value of the firm was independent of the capital 
structure. However, they make this assertion in a world without asymmetries of information, transaction costs, 
taxes, and costs of bankruptcy. Once these variables are included in the model, the use of debt seems to 
generate more benefits for firms. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Cost Of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, 
and Takeovers, 76 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 323 (1986); Richard Brealey, Steward Myers, and Franklin 
Allen, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (McGraw-Hill, 10th Edition, 2011), pp. 460-462; Aurelio Gurrea-
Martínez, The Impact of the Tax Benefits of Debt in the Capital Structure of Firms and the Stability of the 
Financial Systems, OXFORD BUSINESS LAW BLOG, March 2017. For a general analysis of the capital structure of 
firms from a legal and finance perspective, see Eilis Ferran and Look Chan Ho, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE LAW (Cambridge University Press, 2nd Edition, 2014). 
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From the perspective of the tokenholder, the registration of tokens seems a bit clearer. 
Since tokenholders give cryptocurrencies to the issuer in exchange for acquiring the 
promoter´s tokens, those cryptocurrencies should be registered as a decrease in the  
tokenholder´s assets. Simultaneously, as the tokenholder receives some rights (tokens) in 
return for the cryptocurrencies, these rights will increase the tokenholder’s assets.  
 
Another critical aspect of ICOs from an accounting and finance perspective involves the 
valuation and, if so, the impairment of value experienced by the cryptocurrencies held in 
the issuer’s balance-sheet. This aspect becomes particularly problematic in the context of 
cryptocurrencies due to their volatility.86 Moreover, if, as some authors have pointed out,87 
there is a bubble in some cryptocurrencies´ markets, and this bubble bursts, the issuer will 
have to register significant losses in their balance-sheet. Therefore, from an accounting 
perspective, the valuation and impairment of these assets can be particularly relevant not 
only for the company´s financial statements but also for a variety of legal issues. These 
legal issues may from existing covenants, to distribution of dividends, or –in some 
jurisdictions– even the duties and liability of directors if the company´s net assets fall 
below a certain amount of the company´s legal capital.88  
 
Likewise, from the perspective of the tokenholder, the fact that many projects fail may 
force them to register a loss in their assets. Therefore, taking into account that volume and 
value of ICOs are becoming more and more important, we believe that regulators should 
pay special attention to the accounting and finance aspects of ICOs. Otherwise, we face 
the risk of observing something similar to what happened in the 2008 financial crisis: the 
unexpected registration of losses in many companies’ balance-sheets may end up 
harming not only the financial situation of these firms and their investors but also –if the 
volume of tokens is large the enough, and the parties involved are financial institutions– 
the stability of the financial system. 89 
 
IV. Corporate governance issues  
 
1. The concept and nature of tokenholders  
 
The classification of a tokenholder will mainly depend on the nature, features and 
distribution of tokens. From a legal perspective, tokens can be classified as security or 
                                                          
86   The best example can be found in the bitcoin. For the evolution of its price, see https://bitvol.info/  
87 These authors include some Nobel Prizes in Economics such as Professor Robert Shiller: 
https://qz.com/1067557/robert-shiller-wrote-the-book-on-bubbles-he-says-the-best-example-right-now-is-
bitcoin/  
88 See Luca Enriques and Jonathan Macey, Creditors Versos Capital Formation: The Case Against The 
European Legal Capital Rules, 86 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 1165 (2001); Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez, Aurelio Gurrea-
Martínez, The Impact of the Tax Benefits of Debt in the Capital Structure of Firms and the Stability of the 
Financial Systems, OXFORD BUSINESS LAW BLOG, March 2017. 
89 This situation would create a problem of correlation and connectedness. For an analysis of these concepts, 
see Hal S. Scott, CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION: PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM PANICS (MIT Press, 
2016). 
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non-security tokens. Therefore, the purchasers of security tokens will be classified as 
‘security tokenholders’, while the holders of non-security tokens will be considered ‘non-
security tokenholders’. From an accounting and finance perspective, however, the 
classification may seem more unclear. On the one hand, non-security tokenholders should 
generally be classified as debtholders, since they will probably be entitled to future 
products or services. On the other hand, security tokenholders can be classified as either 
equityholders or debtholders, depending on whether they are entitled to the company´s 
ownership or future returns or just to a fixed return, respectively.   
 
Table 3. Legal and finance classification of tokens 
 
Legal classification Finance classification 
Security tokenholder Debtholder/equityholder 
Equity-based securities Equityholders 
Debt-based securities Debtholders 
Non-security tokenholder Debtholder 
 
The fact that a security tokenholder (legal classification) is an equityholder (finance 
classification) does not mean that these tokenholders should be considered 
“shareholders”, even if they have similar rights. Indeed, in our opinion, unless a particular 
jurisdiction allows classifying as shares some particular financial products that look like 
shares but they do not represent a fraction of a company´s legal capital, a tokenholder 
should never be considered a shareholder.90 We do not believe so for several reasons. 
First, it is not clear what a shareholder is exactly entitled to. Indeed, while there are some 
general rights usually held by shareholders (e.g., rights to the company’s future returns, 
rights to the company’s residual assets, right to call the shareholders’ meeting, right to sue 
the managers for a breach of fiduciary duties, etc.), the use of preferred shares or dual-
class shares structure show that many shareholders can be considered as such without 
having some rights generally associated with the condition of shareholders (e.g., vote). 
Therefore, while there are some indicia that may help us identify what a shareholder looks 
like, it is not always clear.  
 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, even though financial markets and institutions 
should be analyzed from a functional approach with particular focus on the economic 
substance rather than its legal form, this functional analysis does not mean that different 
                                                          
90 Our opinion seems to differ here from the Monetary Authority of Singapore. See Monetary Authority of 
Singapore, A Guide to Digital Token Offerings (2018), p. 3 allowing tokens to be considered “shares” when it 
confers or represents ownership interest in a corporation, represents liability of the token holder in the 
corporation, and represents mutual covenants with other token holders in the corporation inter se. However, in 
Singapore, the law seems to distinguish between “stocks” and “shares” – this latter concept seems to be 
broader. See section 2(1) of the SFA, read with section 4(1) of the Companies Act (Cap. 50), expressing that 
“share” means “a share in the share capital of a corporation and includes stock except where a distinction 
between stocks and share is expressed or implied”. See also Ricardo Torres, Problemática jurídica de las 
ICOs: Un análisis desde el Derecho de sociedades, BLOG DEL INSTITUTO IBEROAMERICANO DE DERECHO Y 
FINANZAS, 20 March 2018 (available at http://derechoyfinanzas.org/blog/problematica-juridica-de-las-icos-un-
analisis-desde-el-derecho-de-sociedades/).  
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legal institutions should be considered similar entities but instead that they should be 
subject to similar regulations. For example, in our opinion, even if investment banks and 
commercial banks were performing similar functions, they should not be considered similar 
legal entities. Nevertheless, they should be subject to similar regulations. Therefore, a 
functional approach to financial regulation should not be interpreted as understanding 
different institutions as equal legal entities but treating functionally equivalent institutions 
similarly. Therefore, in this context, even though a shareholder should be distinguished 
from equity tokenholders entitled to similar rights, they both should be subject to a similar 
treatment. Hence, they both should be part of the company’s equity or they both should be 
subordinated in bankruptcy.  
 
Third, in some countries, existing shareholders have preemption rights with the purpose of 
avoiding dilution when a company raises capital. Therefore, if a court or regulator 
interprets ex post that a tokenholder should be considered as a shareholder, existing 
shareholders can lose a right that, regardless of its desirability, the legislator wants them to 
have. Therefore, even though the legislator can solve this problem by requiring 
shareholder vote for any issuance of tokens, this solution might not seem the most 
desirable one for a fundraising method that was probably, among other aspects, to save 
transaction costs. Moreover, even in the absence of transactions costs, if old shareholders 
really want to make tokenholders new shareholders, it may seem more consistent –and 
more desirable to promote legal certainty for both shareholders and tokenholders– to issue 
shares rather than tokens.  
 
Finally, the classification of equitytokenholders as shareholders may also make unclear 
the beneficiaries of managers’ fiduciary duties. In other words, it may make even more 
unclear to whom the managers owe fiduciary duties, and what types of legal rights can be 
exercised –and by who– in the case of a breach of fiduciary duties. Therefore, this 
interpretation may not may crease legal uncertainty but it can also reduce the 
accountability of the board of directors.  
 
For these reasons, we believe that, even when tokenholder have similar rights than those 
generally held by shareholders, they will just be considered equityholders from an 
accounting and finance perspective, or security tokenholders from a legal perspective, but 
never ‘shareholders’. A different conclusion not only would create legal uncertainty but it 
would also be inconsistent with the proper application of the functional approach that 
should prevail in financial regulation. In any case, if, under a particular jurisdiction, financial 
products similar to shares can be classified as such, and the issuance of shares requires 
approval by the shareholders’ meeting, we would suggest that the issuance of security 
tokens should be approved by the shareholders’ meeting, just in case a court eventually 
finds that those tokens should be classified as shares, and therefore shareholders’ rights 
can be affected.  
 
2. Protecting tokenholders from the promoter´s opportunism 
 
2.1. Agency problems in a world of tokenholders 
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While the use of ICOs may serve as a new method to allow individuals and firms to raise 
capital and therefore be able to develop their projects and ideas, the evidence suggests 
that more than 80% of ICOs are scams.91 Therefore, the purchase of tokens should be 
considered a risky activity since the tokenholder is highly exposed to the opportunism of 
the promoter. In some cases, the promoter might not even pursue the promised projects.92 
In others, the promoters may just waste tokenholders’ money when pursuing its goals. In 
both cases, there is a type of agency problem, or a higher risk of opportunism, that should 
be addressed.   
 
This higher risk of opportunism of promoters vis-à-vis tokenholders derives from several 
factors. First, tokenholders do not usually have the ability to appoint, remove and 
remunerate the directors. Therefore, unlike what happens when the suppliers of funds are 
shareholders entitled to vote, the managers might not have enough incentives to maximize 
the interests of the tokenholders, since their jobs will not be at risk. Second, white papers 
may not cover how managers should behave in many cases in which the interests of the 
tokenholders may be at stake. Moreover, unlike what happens in a typical relationship 
between directors and shareholders where fiduciary duties may help fill some gaps93, 
promoters do not usually owe fiduciary duties to tokenholders. Therefore, white papers 
may become more incomplete than a typical corporate contract. Besides, even if they were 
able to fill these gaps, it is not clear how (if so) the rights potentially provided to the 
tokenholders in the white paper will be enforced. Third, while managers in listed 
companies are subject to public scrutiny and a market for corporate control that may 
encourage them to maximize the value of the firm for the interests of the shareholders,94 
these market forces will unlikely exist in a private company issuing tokens. Fourth, unlike 
shareholders, tokenholders are not protected by a country´s company laws. In fact, non-
security tokenholders do not even get the protection of securities law. Fifth and therefore 
due to the lower disclosure requirements imposed to promoters and the complexity behind 
many ICOs, there might be more asymmetries of information between issuers and 
tokenholders. Sixth, there seems to be a type of market euphoria in the crypto-assets 
market that may increase the level of irrational decisions made when purchasing tokens.95 
                                                          
91 Some authors even speak about “Initial Coin Scams”. See https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/ico-cryptocurrency-scams-by-nouriel-roubini-2018-05  
92 Corporate governance is, after all, about promises between managers and investors. See Jonathan Macey, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN (Princeton University Press, 2008).  
93 A corporate contract is, by definition, an incomplete contract. The parties cannot agree ex ante on any single 
contingencies. For these reasons, fiduciary duties and other general provisions may help fill some of the gaps 
existing in corporate contracts. For an analysis of the literature about incomplete contracts in the context of the 
firm and a firm´s capital structures, see  Oliver Hart, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (Oxford 
University Press, 1995); Oliver Hart and John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 JOURNAL 
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1119 (1990); Oliver Hart and John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 THE 
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 115 (1999); Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts 
Approach to Financial Contracting 59 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 473 (1992). 
94 See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
110 (1965); Frank H. Easterbook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of the Target´s Management in 
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1161 (1981).   
95 Alfonso Delgado et al, Towards a Sustainable ICO Process: Community Guidelines on Regulation and Best 
Practices (2016), pp. 26-28. 
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Therefore, all of these factors expose tokenholders to a higher risk of opportunism by 
promoters.  
 
Several strategies can be implemented to reduce agency problems between promoters 
and tokenholders. First, managers can be required to buy a certain percentage of tokens. 
By doing so, they would have more skin in the game, and therefore they would be 
incentivized to make wiser investment decisions. Otherwise, they might end up losing as 
much as the tokenholders.  
 
Second, tokenholders may be empowered with some political rights. For instance, they 
can be allowed to appoint and remove the directors, or even to have a vote on some 
relevant decisions. Thus, the managers would have more incentives to maximize the 
interests of the tokenholders. Otherwise, the tokenholders could easily remove the 
managers.  
 
Third, some market mechanisms can be promoted to protect tokenholders. One of them 
can be the use of platforms to assess issuers and projects, as well as the use of 
intermediaries in the token industry. Another market device may consist of the 
development of secondary markets for tokens. Thus, tokenholders will be protected 
through the use of an easy exit right –which may lead in return to “price” founders’ 
behavior.  
 
Nevertheless, while these mechanisms may reduce managerial agency problems,96 they 
may generate other issues. First, while the fact of requiring insiders to hold a certain 
percentages of tokens would align the interests of managers and tokenholders, promoters 
might not have resources to buy enough tokens as to credibly have skim in the game. In 
fact, that is why they may decide to launch an ICO rather than funding the project by 
themselves. And even if the promoter were able to keep some tokens for free, this 
measure would not work either. On the one hand, if the promotor has not paid for those 
tokens, it would not have enough skin in the game. On the other hand, keeping tokens by 
founders and/or insiders would generate an opportunity cost, since the more tokens 
insiders keep, the less cryptocurrencies (and therefore funding) they will be able to raise. 
Thus, this measure may end up harming the firms´ ability to raise finance.  
 
Second, while empowering tokenholders may align the interests of managers and 
tokenholders, this solution may also generate several problems. On the one hand, this 
power given to tokenholders may increase “principal costs”, that is, the costs associated 
with letting investors decide.97 Moreover, these principal costs can be higher in the context 
                                                          
96 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 305 (1976). 
97 For a novel explanation of principal costs, and how corporate governance should reduce both agency costs 
and principal costs, see Zohar Goshen and Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law 
and Governance, 117 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 767 (2017). Providing various arguments to empower the board, 
see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 
NORWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 547, 573 (2003). See also Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target´s 
Boardroom, 35 BUSINESS LAWYER 101 (1979) and Martijn Cremers and Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder 
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of ICOs, since the fact of making business decisions about technical projects may require 
more expertise than for other businesses. On the other hand, if the white paper confers 
significant power to the tokenholders, and they have the ability to decide some relevant 
business decisions, tokenholders may face the risk of being considered as de facto 
directors.98 And if so, they may end up being liable for some damages. Therefore, 
tokenholders’ rights should be designed in a manner that help reduce managerial 
opportunism without increasing principal costs or putting tokenholders at risk. Finally, 
empowering tokenholders will make the managers more accountable to them at the 
expense of the shareholders. And if so, a type of agency problem among the different 
suppliers of finance may exist due to their potentially different preferences in terms of risks 
and returns.99 For example, while the shareholders, due to their limited liability, variable 
returns and diversified portfolios, are usually more inclined to take risks, creditors usually 
prefer a less risky business strategy. This divergence of interests can be also found 
between shareholders and tokenholders and even among tokenholders. For instance, if 
the returns of a group of powerful tokenholders depend exclusively on a single investment 
project, they may force the managers to invest more time and resources in this project, 
even if that is not the most desirable strategy for other stakeholders or even the company 
as a whole. Therefore, a type of ‘horizontal agency’ problem can be created since the 
managers would be maximizing the interests of a group of investors at the expense of 
others.100  
 
2.2. Legal strategies to protect tokenholders  
 
One of the primary concerns existing in the ICO markets comes from the lack of effective 
tools to protect tokenholders. On the one hand, security tokenholders enjoy a type of 
protection, such as securities law, that might not enough or even adequate for them due to 
several reasons, including the lack of an effective market for corporate control to discipline 
promoters, the higher asymmetries of information probably faced by tokenholders, or the 
more pronounced irrational behavior that may exist in the crypto market. Moreover, in 
many circumstances, the purchasers of security tokens might not even enjoy the 
protection provided by securities laws, since many promoters might not even register their 
issuance of tokens alleging that they are issuing non-security tokens. On the other hand, 
non-security tokenholders are just protected by a private document, such as the white 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 67 (2016).  In favor of empowering investors, however, 
see Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 833 (2005); 
Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, New Agency Problems: New Legal Rules? Rethinking Takeover Regulation in the US 
and Europe, INSTITUTO IBEROAMERICANO DE DERECHO Y FINANZAS, WORKING PAPER SERIES 3/2016.  
98 For an analysis of this concept, see Roy Goode, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW (Sweeet & 
Maxwell, 4th Edition, 2011), pp. 641-647.  
99 For an analysis of these conflicts among shareholders, see John Armour, Henry Hansmann, and Reinier 
Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in John Armour, Luca Enriques et al, THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 29-30; Mark J. 
Roe, The Institutions of Corporate Governance, in Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley (eds.), HANDBOOK OF 
NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (Kluwer, 2005). 
100 For the concept of ‘horizontal agency problems’ in corporate governance, see Mark J. Roe, The Institutions 
of Corporate Governance, in Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley (eds.), HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS (Springer, 2005), pp. 371–377. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3182261 
32 
 
paper, whose ability to be enforced is not even clear. Therefore, it should be a priority for 
the regulator to implement new legal tools to protect tokenholders.   
 
2.2.1. Protecting security tokenholders 
 
Security tokenholders are currently protected by two primary mechanisms: (i) the 
apparatus provided by securities law, which include disclosure obligations, procedural 
rules, supervision by the securities regulator, and a market of securities lawyers monitoring 
whether companies are complying with securities laws to otherwise sue them on behalf of 
investors; and (ii) the white paper. Nevertheless, as it has been mentioned, the white 
paper does not provide an effective tool to protect tokenholders since, due to the absence 
of mandatory disclosure for white papers, the promotor may just establish and disclose 
whatever it can be in its interest. Likewise, current securities law might not be enough, or 
even appropriate, to protect tokenholders. For this reason, we believe that securities 
regulators should implement a new legal strategy to protect security tokenholders. This 
strategy, as mentioned in section II, should consist on requiring promoters to submit an 
electronic form to the security regulator or any other public authority disclosing certain 
information particularly relevant for the protection of tokenholders. The information 
provided in this electronic form may include the promoter´s location, problem and 
proposed technology solution, description of the token, blockchain governance, 
qualifications of the technical team, risk factors, identity of the promoters, legal advisors, 
accounting and finance aspects of the ICO, and legal or contractual provisions available to 
protect tokenholders (if any). Moreover, the information provided in the electronic form 
should be based on a system of smart disclosure, in which more attention will be paid to 
the type of information provided in the form, as well as the way issuers provide this 
information, rather than the amount of information itself.  
 
 
2.2.2. Protecting non-security tokenholders  
 
In addition to the protection provided by the electronic form imposed to any issuance of 
tokens, we think that other legal devices should be implemented to protect non-security 
tokenholders. After all, they are not protected by securities laws, as it may happen with 
security tokenholders. In our opinion, these legal devices to protect tokenholders can be 
inspired on those generally used to protect consumers and more especially financial 
consumers.  
 
First, regulators may impose cooling off periods on any issuance of non-security tokens. 
Thus, non-security tokenholders will be able to return the token within a given period of 
time without bearing any cost. This measure not only will protect non-security tokenholders 
ex post, but it will also encourage many issuers to think twice what they are going to sell.  
 
Second, policy-makers may also opt for regulating products. Through this mechanism, the 
regulator may think of prohibiting certain terms particularly obscure or even tokens.  
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Third, as it has been developed in the context of financial consumers after the failure of 
some of the previous strategies, regulators may also decide to impose conduct obligations 
on the issuer. Namely, it may require issuers to take into account the interest of 
tokenholders, avoiding situations in which the issuer seeks to exploit non-security 
tokenholders’ biases and mistakes.  
 
Finally, an additional tool to protect non-security tokenholders may consist on using 
litigation rules. For instance, the legislator may establish that any unclear provision 
established in the white paper should be interpreted in favor of non-security tokenholders. 
By doing that, not only non-security tokenholders will enjoy ex post a higher level of 
protection, but issuers will also have incentives to draft the clauses established in the white 
paper in a clearer and more protective way to favor the understanding of these clauses by 
tokenholders.101   
 
2.3. Market devices to protect tokenholders  
 
In addition to the legal and regulatory devices to protect security and non-security 
tokenholders, we believe that some market mechanisms may also reduce the agency 
problems existing between issuers and tokenholder. For example, the development of a 
liquid secondary market for tokens may provide a greater level of protection to 
tokenholders. Moreover, it would do so in several ways. First, a more liquid market for 
tokens would make easier for tokenholders to sell their tokens. Therefore, these ‘exit 
rights’ could serve as ex post mechanism to protect tokenholders.  
 
Second, the existence of a liquid market may contribute to “price” the behavior of many 
projects and promoters. Namely, by observing whether tokenholders buy or sell shares, 
and therefore whether the price of a given token goes up or down, the market can infer the 
promoters’ behavior. Therefore, promoters, or at least those interested in issuing future 
tokens, will have strong incentives to behave in an efficient an honest manner.  
 
Third, if these markets are developed, there will be more platforms and analysts providing 
advice and ‘grading’ projects and promoters.102 Nevertheless, while this market of 
intermediaries can generate several benefits for tokenholders, regulators should pay close 
attention to the potential conflicts of interests faced by these actors. Indeed, the lessons 
learnt in the past from auditors103, credit rating agencies104 and proxy advisors105 show that 
                                                          
101 For a general view about the challenges faced by consumer when they make decisions and how regulators 
can improve consumer protection, see Oren Bar-Gill, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND 
PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (Oxford University Press 2012); and Omri Ban Shagar and Carl E. 
Schneider, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED Disclosure (Princeton University 
Press, 2014). Focusing on financial consumers, and different regulatory approaches to protect financial 
consumers, see John Armour et al, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 
205-223 and 255-271 
102 Some of these platforms already exist, as it can be the case of websites like “icoratings.com”, “icoalert.com” 
and “icomonitor.io”. See Alfonso Delgado et al, Towards a Sustainable ICO Process: Community Guidelines on 
Regulation and Best Practices (2016), pp. 28.  
103 Arieh Goldman and Benzion Barlev, The Auditor-Firm Conflict of Interests: Its Implications for 
Independence, 49 THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW 707 (1974); Matthew J. Barrett, Enron and Andersen - What Went 
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these “gatekeepers” can be subject to a variety of conflicts of interests. Therefore, 
regulators can use some of the regulatory strategies implemented for auditors, credit rating 
agencies and proxy advisors to deal with the problems associated with the rise of 
platforms and analysts in the ICO industry. These strategies may include disclosure 
obligations (especially when the analyst has been paid by the issuer for any other 
professional service), restrictions in the variety of professional services potentially provided 
by these analysts, as well as liability rules.  
 
V. Anti-Money Laundering implications of ICOS 
 
Tokens created on a blockchain are decentralized and encrypted, sometimes making it 
harder to track each of the transactions made, and the individuals behind them. Therefore, 
in theory, anyone with an internet connection and a digital wallet can be part of a token 
sale event. That can leave room for people to launder money or finance terrorism activities 
and engage in other fraudulent behaviors. Additionally, taking into account how easy it is 
to launch a token pre-sale, these mechanisms could be use un countries where illegal 
activities such as corruption are above average in order to move resources without 
oversight. Nonetheless, we could not find available data showing how much money is 
being laundered through ICOs.  
 
Regulators in the United States and Singapore have been particularly active highlighting 
the risks of money laundering and frauds that investors face when buying tokens. 
Singapore's financial regulatory body and central bank, the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (“MAS”), stated that: "ICOs are vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist 
financing (ML/TF) risks due to the anonymous nature of the transactions, and the ease 
with which large sums of monies may be raised in a short period of time”.106 MAS’ media 
release of 13 March 2014 had communicated that while virtual currencies per se were not 
regulated, intermediaries in virtual currencies would be regulated for ML/TF risks. MAS is 
currently assessing how to regulate ML/TF risks associated with activities involving digital 
tokens that do not function solely as virtual currency."107 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Wrong and Why Similar Audit Failures Could Happen Again, in Nancy B. Rapoport and Bala G. Dharan (eds.), 
ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Foundation Press 2004), pp. 155-168; Walter Doralt, 
Andreas Martin Fleckner, Klaus J. Hopt, Christoph Kumpan, Felix Steffek, Reinhard Zimmermann, Alexander 
Hellgardt, Susanne Augenhofer, Auditor Independence at the Crossroads – Regulation and Incentives, 13 
EUROPEAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW 89 (2012). 
104 Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, Financial 
Gatekepeers: Can they protect investors? San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-46 (2006); Carol Ann Frost, 
Credit Rating Agencies in Capital Markets: A Review of Research Evidence on Selected Criticisms of the 
Agencies, 22 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING AND FINANCE 1 (2007). 
105 The conflicts of interest of proxy advisors have not been that evident. They were identified more recently. 
See Guy Rolnik, The Powerful Private Regulator and the Effects of Conflicts of Interest, ProMarket, May 3, 
2017 (https://promarket.org/powerful-private-regulator-effects-conflicts-interest/); Tao Li, Outsourcing 
Corporate Governance: Conflicts of Interest Within the Proxy Advisory Industry, MANAGEMENT SCIENCE (2018); 
ESMA, Discussion Paper An Overview of the Proxy Advisory Industry: Considerations on Possible Policy 
Options (2012) (https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2012-212.pdf)  
106
 MAS clarifies regulatory position on the offer on digital tokens in Singapore. Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (August, 2017) (available at: http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-
Releases/2017/MAS-clarifies-regulatory-position-on-the-offer-of-digital-tokens-in-Singapore.aspx)   
107 MAS clarifies regulatory position on the offer on digital tokens in Singapore. Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (August, 2017) (available at: http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-
Releases/2017/MAS-clarifies-regulatory-position-on-the-offer-of-digital-tokens-in-Singapore.aspx)  
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For MAS, even digital tokens that perform functions which may not be within MAS’ 
regulatory purview for not fitting into the legal category of securities, may nonetheless be 
subject to legislation for combating money laundering and terrorism financing. MAS 
highlights in particular the following: (i) obligations to report suspicious transactions with 
the Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office, Commercial Affairs Department of the 
Singapore Police Force, and (ii) prohibitions from dealing with or providing financial 
services to designated individuals and entities pursuant to the Terrorism (Suppression of 
Financing) Act and various regulations giving effect to United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions.  
 
Moreover, issuers of tokens could be subject to licensing requirements under the 
Securities and Futures Act and the Financial Advisers Act. In addition, platforms facilitating 
secondary trading of such tokens would also have to be approved or recognized by MAS 
as an approved exchange or recognized market operator respectively. This regulatory 
authority also announced the drafting of a new payments services framework that will 
include rules to address money laundering and terrorism financing risks relating to the 
dealing or exchange of cryptocurrencies for fiat or other digital assets such as tokens. 
Such intermediaries will be required to put in place policies, procedures and controls to 
address such risks. These will include requirements to conduct customer due diligence, 
monitor transactions, perform screening, report suspicious transactions and keep 
adequate records.108 
 
Along the same lines, United States Authorities delivered similar statements in regard of 
AML compliance and ICOs. On one hand, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) provided guidelines on its website for investors to consider before participating in 
token sales. Some of the key points the SEC asks potential buyers to consider are that 
there are ways to identify fraudulent investment schemes.109 On the other hand, the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) published a letter indicating that the U.S. 
agency will apply its regulations to ICOs. In the letter, FinCEN explained that both 
developers/issuers/sellers and exchanges involved in the sale of an ICO-derived token 
would be liable to register as a money transmitter and comply with the relevant statutes 
around anti-money laundering and know-your-customer rules.110  
 
The FinCEN letter recognizes that ICOs vary not only from the functional or legally but 
approach, but also that there are jurisdictional differences depending on the structure of an 
ICO and its associated token. In sum, FinCEN asserted that it considers the transmission 
of newly-issued digital tokens derived from ICOs to be subject to the money transmitter 
rules under the Bank Secrecy Act . This means that developers and exchanges that sell 
ICO coins or tokens, or exchange them for other virtual currency or something else of 
value, must register as money services businesses and comply with (i) the Bank Secrecy 
Act rules regarding Know-Your-Customer obligations, (ii) the implementation of an anti-
money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism compliance program, and (iii) 
                                                          
108 Monetary Authority of Singapore, A Guide to Digital Token Offerings (2018) 
109 The SEC even launched in May, 2018 a fake ICO, pre-selling a coin called Howey Coin, to show how easy 
it is to scam investors.  See https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-sec-created-a-mock-ico-website-to-show-
just-how-easy-it-is-for-investors-to-get-fleeced-2018-05-16 and https://www.howeycoins.com/index.html  
110 See Letter from Financial Crime Enforcement Network to Committee on Finance, United States Senate. 
(February, 2018) (available at: https://coincenter.org/files/2018-03/fincen-ico-letter-march-2018-coin-center.pdf)  
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the filing of suspicious activity reports. FinCEN also reminded that U.S. persons must 
comply with all applicable Office of Foreign Assets Control financial sanctions obligations. 
 
FinCEN reported to the Senate that since 2014 it has examined roughly one-third of the 
approximately 100 virtual currency businesses that have registered and has initiated 
several investigations and enforcement actions against firms and individuals. However, it 
is important to clarify that this letter is not yet a formal FinCEN guidance. 
 
Regarding the European Union, in February 2018, the European Commission launches 
the European Union Blockchain Observatory and Forum which will highlight key 
developments of the blockchain technology, promote European actors and reinforce 
European engagement with multiple stakeholders involved in blockchain activities.111 Even 
though, tokens and ICOs remain unanalyzed by policy makers and regulators by European 
central authorities, the Council of the European Union approved the 5th AML Directive and, 
among other changes, introduced AML obligations applicable to exchange platforms of 
virtual currencies.112  Providers of exchange services between virtual and fiat currencies, 
and custodian wallet providers will have to comply with the AML Directive. Despite this, it 
is doubtful whether these provisions are suitable to put an end to money laundering using 
virtual currencies, because virtual currencies can still be exchanged between private 
actors without any monitoring. Actually, there is no reference in the Directive to ICOs.113  
 
Given the regulatory uncertainty, several crypto exchanges in these jurisdictions where 
they are clearly subject to AML compliance, and also banks, may refuse to work with ICO 
projects or ICO founders which do not identify buyers of their tokens. This market behavior 
will possibly force ICOs to voluntarily comply with the AML regulation, or at least to identify 
the buyers of the tokens. We do not have available data to confirm this hypothesis though.  
 
This means that regulators still need to work on how the best way is to prevent money 
laundering when operating on a blockchain where the jurisdictional limits become more 
confusing or non-existing, and where players operate through online platforms rather than 
physical markets. Perhaps the understanding of these features will lead to different 
solutions for preventing money laundering in blockhain-based markets, for example, 
working with digital identity mechanisms to countering the anonymities of ICOs 
nowadays.114  
                                                          
111 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-521_en.pdf.   
112 Neither tokens or ICOs. 
113 It seems that the definition of exchanges does not encompass ICO companies as they do not – generally, but 
with some exceptions - enable their users to change their tokens into fiat money. It also seems that they do not 
fall within the definition of wallet providers as the funds, which they receive within the ICO, belong to the 
company, not to the tokenholders. Developers do not hold their users’ private keys for the users’ wallets, but 
only holds private keys for its own wallets. 
However, most developers exchange the raised cryptocurrencies to fiat and deposit them at a bank account for 
their operational needs. Therefore some could argue that they facilitate an exchange from cryptocurrencies to 
money. See Nejc Novak. EU Introduces Anti-money Laundering Regulation. (2018) 
https://medium.com/@nejcnovaklaw/eu-introduces-crypto-anti-money-laundering-regulation-d6ab0ddedd3  
114 See World Economic Forum. Digital Identity. On the Threshold of a Digital Identity Revolution. White paper 
(January, 2018) (available at: 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/White_Paper_Digital_Identity_Threshold_Digital_Identity_Revolution_report_20
18.pdf)  
See Also Digital Identity is the key to the Blockchain Economy. https://dailyfintech.com/2018/03/24/digital-
identity-is-the-key-to-the-blockchain-economy/  
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VI. New challenges for privacy law and data protection  
 
The rise of cryptocurrencies, ICOs and, in general, blockchain use cases, is also 
generating several issues with regards to privacy law and protection of personal data. The 
nature of the public blockchain means that every transaction taking place will be published 
and linked to a published public key that represents a particular user. However, that key is 
encrypted, and no one would be able to directly identify the users settling transactions on a 
blockchain.115 In a blockchain, each block contains a reference to the preceding block by 
including a cryptographic hash of the data within the preceding block. If the data in a block 
is altered, the hash of the block changes too, and this falsification of the records can 
therefore be detected.116 
 
However, this operation give rise to some issues regarding personal data, especially in 
countries that follow the European Union standard of the General Data Protection 
Regulation Directive (“GDPR”). Data protection rules do not apply to anonymized data and 
some could consider that because of hashing and encryption, blockchain anonymizes 
data. This could be debated because anonymized qualification of data is very strict, 
particularly under European rules. Hashing permits records to be linked, thus it will 
generally be considered a pseudonymization technique, not an anonymization.117  
 
Additionally, Data stored on a blockchain is tamper proof, so deleting it later on is not an 
option. Moreover, transactions on a blockchain are “immutable”, which really means that 
once a blockchain transaction has received a sufficient level of validation, some 
cryptography ensures that it can never be replaced or reversed.118 Thus, this data cannot 
be deleted once it is inserted in blockchain. This feature could be also conflictive with 
privacy laws and the Right to be Forgotten or Right to Erasure.119 This consists in the right 
to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data without undue delay. However, it 
is not clear what erasure of data actually means. The GDPR initiative probably did not 
have in mind a distributed data storage mechanism such as blockchain, but only a 
centralized or non-distributed data controller. The fact that this unique feature of 
blockchain technology does not match with privacy rules creates some friction and 
uncertainty for compliance. 
 
This takes us to the next problem regarding privacy law and blockchain. Who is the data 
controller on a blockchain? Due to the distributed nature of blockchain, there is not any 
centralized entity gathering and managing this information. In consequence, more than 
one party may qualify as controller, which means that several participants of the network 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
See also https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Digital-Identity_the-current-state-of-
affairs.pdf  
115 See How Blockchain Encryptation works. TechRepublic (November, 2017), available at: 
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-blockchain-encryption-works-its-all-about-math/  
116 See What is Hashing? under the Hood of Blockchain, Blockgeeks (2017), Available at: 
https://blockgeeks.com/guides/what-is-hashing/  
117 Hogan Lovels LLP, A Guide to Blockchain and Data Protection, available at: 
https://www.hlengage.com/_uploads/downloads/5425GuidetoblockchainV9FORWEB.pdf  
118 See Gideon Greenspan, The Blockchain Immutability Myth, Coindesk (May, 2017), available at: 
https://www.coindesk.com/blockchain-immutability-myth/  
119 See Section 3,  Article 17, GDPR. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&from=EN  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3182261 
38 
 
could be responsible for compliance with privacy regulations. Governance agreements 
might be necessary among participants to define the responsibilities as data controllers or 
data processors.  
 
The applicable jurisdiction can also be a problem for blockchain use cases. Blockchains 
usually have a cross-border nature and an important aspect for privacy laws. In some 
jurisdictions, privacy law differs from contract law because parties are not allowed to 
establish the applicable law. The applicable law depends on factors listed in GDPR,120 for 
example. As a result, the way blockchain technology operates (based on a system of 
encryption and hashing) does not seen to be compatible with the traditional system to 
protect personal data. Therefore, if policy-makers want to promote the use of blockchain 
technologies, as we believe they should, the approach to deal with personal data should 
be changed. Regarding blockchain use cases in general, there is still a long way for 
developers and policy makers to clarify how blockchain fits into the privacy rules world. 
 
VII. Insolvency  
 
The rise of ICOs may also generate some problems in case of insolvency. Indeed, if the 
debtor´s assets are not sufficient to pay all its debts, the way the ranking of claims in the 
scheme of distribution may become a very sensitive issue.121 In a world of tokenholder, 
one may wonder in which position tokenholders should be paid. To answer this question, it 
seems relevant to distinguish between equity-tokenholders and debt-tokenholders.  
 
Following the absolute priority rule,122 it seems clear that debt-tokenholders should always 
be paid ahead of equity-tokenholders, since the latter are functionally equivalent to 
shareholders and shareholders cannot get paid ahead of the creditors in an event of 
insolvency. The situation becomes more controversial in the context of debtholders vis-à-
vis other creditors, or even between equityholders and shareholders. In these cases, we 
believe that the solution should depend on whether the white paper mentions something. If 
the white paper does not specify how debtokenholders should be paid, they should be paid 
as general unsecured creditors. Therefore, they will be paid pro rata according to the pari 
passu principle.123 Likewise, equity-tokenholders would be paid ahead of shareholders, 
since the latter is the one legally entitled to the company´s residual assets.  
 
However, the white paper may establish the treatment of tokenholders in bankruptcy. In 
those cases, the treatment of tokenholders in bankruptcy will depend on the views taken 
on insolvency procedures. If a country follows a contractual approach to bankruptcy, these 
rights should be preserved.124 Therefore, equity-tokenholders may end up getting paid 
                                                          
120 See Article 3 of the GDPR, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&from=EN 
121 This work uses the word “bankruptcy procedures” and “insolvency proceeding” as synonyms.  
122 According to this principle existing in most insolvency jurisdictions, junior creditors cannot get paid until 
senior creditors have been paid in full, and shareholders cannot get any value out of the firm until the 
company´s creditors have been paid in full. For a deeper analysis of this principle, see Douglas G. Baird, 
ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY (Foundation Press, 5th Edition, 2010), pp. 71-77. 
123 For an analysis of this principle, see Roy Goode, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW (Sweeet & 
Maxwell, 4th Edition, 2011), pp. 235-240. 
124 However, this is not the general rules. Most insolvency jurisdictions provide a mandatory state-provided set 
of bankruptcy rules. So far, the contractual approach has been proposed just in the literature. See Robert 
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after or along with the shareholders if the white papers says so, and debt-tokenholders 
may be ranked ahead or after general unsecured creditors.  
 
However, it is far from clear that this contractual approach will be applied in practice. 
Namely, we believe that a subordination clause will probably be applied, since it does not 
harm other creditors – in fact, it will be for the benefit of the other creditors due to the fact 
that, following the absolute priority rule, subordination creditors will only get paid if more 
senior creditors have been paid in full. More problems may arise, however, if the white 
paper gives a priority claim to the tokenholders in case of bankruptcy. Under this scenario, 
unless the insolvency legislation recognizes this priority or “any priority created by 
contract”, this preferential treatment may not be enforceable. Therefore, tokenholders 
should carefully analyze how they would be paid in bankruptcy, and whether the treatment 
proposed in bankruptcy would be enforceable or not under a particular jurisdiction.  
 
In addition to dealing with claims, an insolvency procedure also deals with assets. After all, 
the assets will determine whether and, if so, how and how much, the creditors are getting 
paid. In the context of an ICO, the person or entity in charge of managing the insolvency 
proceeding will face two primary problems: (i) the valuation of these assets associated with 
the ICO (that is, the cryptocurrencies received in exchange for the tokens); and (ii) the 
ability of those assets to be converted to cash (liquidity). When the cryptocurrencies 
received by the issuer are generally accepted in the market (e.g., Bitcoin, Ethers, etc.), the 
liquidity problem will unlikely exist. Nevertheless, the valuation problem may still be 
relevant. Indeed, as it was mentioned above, cryptocurrencies are very volatile assets. In 
other words, their value may rise or drop rapidly. As a result, this volatility may create 
some problems not only for the trustee or debtor in possession but also for the creditors, 
whose rights and decisions may be affected by the volatility of these assets. For example, 
if they know that the cryptocurrencies held by the issuer can be sold and get enough cash 
to repay their debts, perhaps they may prefer liquidation over reorganization. However, if 
the liquidation value of the company is not enough to pay even part of their claims (among 
other reasons, due to the lack of value of the cryptocurrencies), a creditor may have 
incentives to preserve reorganization over liquidation – especially if the issuer´s future 
cash-flows are positive. Therefore, we believe that trustees or debtor in possession should 
warn creditors about the importance of the volatility of the cryptocurrencies potentially held 
by the issuer, since it may be a factor potentially relevant for their decisions in bankruptcy.  
 
Additionally, along with the valuation of the cryptocurrencies received by the issuer, 
another problem potentially existing in the context of ICOs is the valuation of the tokens. 
While this problem will not be relevant for the insolvency proceeding of the issuer, it will be 
in the case that the tokenholder becomes insolvent. In these situations, the trustee or 
debtor in possession will face the challenge to value those tokens, which can be 
particularly difficult in the absence of a secondary market. Therefore, in these 
circumstances, the trustee or debtor in possession will be required to use some general 
methods to value assets, including their ability to generate future cash flows. For that 
purpose, it will be relevant to determine whether the issuer will finally be able to honor the 
obligations assumed with the tokenholder. If not, the value of the token will be close to 
zero. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Rasmussen, Debtor´s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 51 (1992); 
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VIII. International challenges and cooperation in ICOs  
 
Most securities regulators are issuing some guidance regarding ICOs. In fact, IOSCO has 
even created a section on its website to include statements issued by many securities 
regulators around the world with regards to ICOs.125 This is a desirable initiative to 
contribute to the understanding and “brainstorming” about how regulators should address 
ICOs. Namely, by being able to know how other jurisdictions are addressing the same 
challenge, regulators and policy-makers will be able to come up with more ideas to 
regulate ICOs in a more efficient and effective manner.  
 
However, these initiatives are not enough. On the one hand, it is very costly to analyze 
each country’s regulatory approach to deal with ICOs. On the other hand, the work 
developed by international organizations in this space does not analyze the pros and cons 
of each regulatory solution. For this reason, it would seem desirable if an international 
organization such as IOSCO issues some guidance on ICOs, as least to establish: (i) the 
rationale and operation of ICOs; (ii) a proposed explanation and classification of tokens; 
(iii) the different regulatory approaches that may be implemented to deal with ICOs; (iii) the 
applicable law that should govern ICOs; (iv) the costs and benefits of each regulatory 
approach; (v) other issues potential relevant for securities regulators, such as how to 
protect tokenholders, or how to deal with other challenges raised by ICOs such as anti-
money laundering. Thus, even though each securities regulator will be able to choose one 
model or another, all of them will have the opportunity to know and assess each model in 
order to decide which one fits best in their financial system, taking into account the 
priorities of the regulator (e.g., investor protection, innovation, financial stability, prevention 
of financial crime, etc.), as well as the particular features of the country (e.g., type of 
investors –institutional or retail– existing in their capital markets, size and expertise of the 
regulator, etc.). In addition, we also believe that the International Accounting Standard 
Board (“IASB”) should also issue an International Financial Reporting Standard (“IFRS”) to 
clarity how to register an issuance of tokens.  
 
Finally, we also believe financial cooperation and the understanding of each country’s laws 
and  corresponding regulatory model to deal with ICOs, is relevant as a mechanism to 
know the scope of each country’s jurisdiction. For example, while some countries may 
apply their laws just to any issuance of tokens taking place in their countries, other 
jurisdictions may find: (i) their enforcement regimes effective enough to require issuers to 
comply with their existing securities laws (or at least to submit the proposed form in their 
countries); (ii) to initiate investigations and enforcement actions because the issuer is 
registered or incorporated in the country; or (iii) just because some of tokenholders are 
from their jurisdictions.  
 
For this reason, and taking into account the different regulatory models existing to deal 
with ICOs, we think that issuers, regulators and tokenholders should be aware of the 
applicable law (and competent regulator) to a given issuance of tokens. Otherwise, the 
issuance may be subject to legal uncertainty at the expense of not only the issuer but also 
–and perhaps more importantly– the tokenholders and the financial authorities in charge of 
protecting these tokenholders. Therefore, in the absence of a global regulatory framework 
                                                          
125 See https://www.iosco.org/publications/?subsection=ico-statements  
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for ICOs, which seems very unlikely, we propose that an international agreement to deal 
with some procedural (mainly jurisdictional) aspects of ICOs would be desirable. 
 
IX. Future of capital markets, finance and corporate governance in a 
world of tokenized securities 
 
Tokenization may bring positive paradigm shifts to finance, law, government, and more. It 
can represent changes in the ways we consume goods or replace traditional investments 
in capital markets. Perhaps, companies and regulators can learn from ICOs and start 
thinking about improving markets by using blockchain as a new way for delivering goods 
and distributing securities.  
 
Due to the absence of financial intermediaries, which means less transactions costs, and 
the possibility for developers to fund long-term projects where it may take years to capture 
value,126 ICOs allow companies to raise an important amount of funds in the early stages 
of a project. Also, the features of tokens vary, providing founders and investors different 
types of instruments to offer or buy in these markets. Additionally, since tokens fund 
networks, the buyers – specially retail buyers – of a token are highly interested in making 
these networks grow.127 These characteristics of token sales make us beleive that the 
trend of tokenizing securities or goods is attractive for capital markets.  
 
Essentially, tokenization is a method that converts rights to an asset into a digital token. 
Blockchain hype made the world interested in exploring ways to successfully tokenize real-
world assets. This encompasses usage cases of blockchain that are trying to bring this 
technology to the traditional registry of shares. For example, in May 2016, the Delaware 
Blockchain Initiative was launched128 and is currently in an implementation stage. The 
Delaware General Corporation Law was amended in order to make it legal for entities 
incorporated in Delaware to use blockchain technology for recordkeeping and 
administration of stock ledgers.129 This is impressive since Delaware is regarded as one of 
the most important states for corporate law in United States and the world. In 2015, 86% of 
all IPOs chose to incorporate in Delaware; more than half of all United States publicly 
                                                          
126 Since ICOs mostly fund blockchain-based projects. Some of these ideas promise to be disruptive in many 
markets or industries as use cases of this new technology. Because of this, the implementation of the use 
cases could take some time to be accepted as a mainstream in many industries. See also Alfonso Delgado et 
al, Towards a Sustainable ICO Process: Community Guidelines on Regulation and Best Practices (2016). 
127 This statement is probably not applicable to qualified investors, particularly those funds that are known for 
participating in pre-sales of tokens and then dump their investments only to make profits. 
128 In May, 2016 Jack Markell – Governor of the State of Delaware – announced an initiative by the State of 
Delaware to embrace the emerging blockchain and smart contract technology industry, which can help the 
public and enterprises lower their transactional costs, speed up and automate manual processes, and reduce 
fraud. This announcement took place in Consensus 2016 conference, which is currently one of the most 
important international conferences on blockchain currently. See the entire speech here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-mgxEhIvSTY Analyzing the features and challenges of this initiative, see 
Nydia Remolina, La incorporación de blockchain en el Derecho de sociedades de Delaware, BLOG DEL 
INSTITUTO IBEROAMERICANO DE DERECHO Y FINANZAS, 28 August 2017 (available at 
http://www.derechoyfinanzas.org/la-incorporacion-de-blockchain-en-el-derecho-de-sociedades-de-delaware/).  
129 See Delaware Eyeing Blockchain to Improve Corporate Processes (April, 2017), available at: 
https://www.bna.com/delaware-eyeing-blockchain-n57982086257/  
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traded companies and 66% of Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware as 
well.130  
 
In December 2016, Overstock.com Inc. became the first publicly traded company to issue 
stock via blockchain thanks to the Delaware Blockchain Initiative131. One year later 
Overstock.com Inc launched an ICO (only pre-sale) through its subsidiary tZERO to fund 
the development of an exchange to facilitate the trading of blockchain-based assets, 
including securities.132 However, Overstock.com Inc. announced the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission is investigating the tZERO Coin pre-sale,133 therefore the project 
will probably be delayed indefinitely.   
 
Despite the uncertainty that these cases portray for the implementation of blockchain 
technology for stock ledgers, the advantages of using it should be explored in depth. 
Initiatives such as Delaware could bring the benefits investors and companies are 
experiencing with ICOs to a much broader audience and enhance the development of 
capital markets, finance and corporate governance. Many years ago, the securities 
markets went digital and now there are not many investors holding physical certificates of, 
for example, shares. However, true benefits of digitization will only reach the securities 
industry when its layers of settlement processes are finally streamlined, so that securities 
issuers and investors can again interact directly, which is something that could be 
achieved by blockchain technology.134 With blockchain, buyers of shares and corporations 
are expected to have a clear ownership record, lenders holding security interests in 
pledged stock are expected to be able to foreclose after a triggering event, distribution of 
dividends and payments are expected clearer as well.135 Knowing who owns which shares 
is a fundamental corporate governance requirement. Blockchain technology should make 
it easy to know at a specific moment the number of shares that a shareholder owns and 
who exactly are those shareholders. Nowadays corporations – especially publicly-traded 
corporations– rely on intermediaries to know this information (i.e. when using omnibus 
accounts, central depositories, etc.).  
 
The Dole Food Company, Inc class action is an example of why accurate stock ownership 
is not achieved in markets today.  In this case, there were more than 36 million shares in 
                                                          
130 See Delaware Division of Corporations 2015 Annual Report, available at: 
https://corp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2015%20Annual%20Report.pdf  .  
131 See Michael Del Castillo, Overstock Could Rise $30 Million With Blockchain Stock Offering. Coindesk 
(November, 2016), available at: https://www.coindesk.com/overstock-raise-30-million-blockchain-stock-
offering/  
132 See Bradly Dale, The Next Step In Overstock’s Master Blockchain Plan is Underway, Coindesk (December, 
2017), available at:  https://www.coindesk.com/tzeros-ico-one-part-overstocks-master-blockchain-plan/  
133 Overstock.com Inc. (2018). Form 8-K 2018.  
134 For a detailed explanation of the Delaware Blockchain Initiative see Andrea Tinianow and Caitlin  Long. 
Delaware Blockchain Initiative: Transforming the Foundational Infrastructure of Corporate Finance, HARVARD 
LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION BLOG, available at: 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/16/delaware-blockchain-initiative-transforming-the-foundational-
infrastructure-of-corporate-finance/. See also Nydia Remolina, La incorporación de Blockchain en el Derecho 
de Sociedades de Delaware. BLOG DEL INSTITUTO IBEROAMERICANO DE DERECHO Y FINANZAS (2018), available at: 
http://derechoyfinanzas.org/blog/la-incorporacion-del-blockchain-en-el-derecho-de-sociedades-de-delaware/  
135 Wonnie Song, Bullish on Blockchain: Examining Delaware’s Approach to Distributed Ledger Technology in 
Corporate Governance Law and Beyond. HARVARD BUSINESS LAW REVIEW (2018), available at 
http://www.hblr.org/2018/01/bullish-on-blockchain-examining-delawares-approach-to-distributed-ledger-
technology-in-corporate-governance-law-and-beyond/ 
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the class, but claimants submitted facially valid claims for more than 49 million shares 
which is 33% more Dole common stock than those that actually existed. Clearly, no single 
ledger kept track –in real time– of stock ownership. When an investor buys a share of 
common stock in a listed corporation, the investor typically does not hold that share 
directly. Generally, from the corporation’s perspective, a company called Cede & Co. (a 
nominee of the Depositary Trust Company (“DTC”)136 is the “record owner” of all the stock, 
all the time. Investor’s broker keeps an entry in its database showing you as the stock’s 
beneficial owner, and DTC keeps an entry in its database of the investor broker’s 
ownership.137 
 
Dell’s 2013 go-private merger is another type of case detailing how blockchain technology 
could potentially help to prevent proxy voting mistakes derived from direct versus indirect 
ownership of shares. T. Rowe Price lost standing to seek appraisal even though it had 
vocally opposed and repeatedly tried to vote against the merger. In order to vote on the 
Dell buyout, T. Rowe Price had to send its vote through intermediaries. A service provider, 
which was a third party, later provided an updated record related to the merger. This 
updated record triggered T. Rowe Price’s automated voting system, which was set to vote 
in favor of any management-recommended merger, like the Dell merger was. Despite T. 
Rowe Price’s intention to oppose the Dell merger, it ultimately voted in favor, losing 
standing to sue for appraisal.  T. Rowe Price ended up paying $194 million to compensate 
its clients for actions for loss of appraisal rights derived from this proxy voting mistake.138 
 
Using smart contracts opens a world of possibilities for corporations, even for compliance 
processes and corporate governance matters. For example, a corporation could use 
blockchain to record directors’ votes to ensure they act accordingly to regulation and 
internal policies. A corporation could also program shares issued in a private placement to 
be issuable only to the digital wallets of those who qualify as accredited investors. 
Tokenized shares could also be programmed to facilitate the execution of covenants 
agreed in financing contracts with creditors.139 And there are more applications to explore 
for shares issued in a blockchain as tokens in ICOs.  
 
Some other states are following Delaware’s ideas. Wyoming is one example. The 
Wyoming Blockchain Coalition is focused on encouraging the adoption of blockchain 
technology in Wyoming and, so far, has been incredibly successful. In fact Wyoming has 
                                                          
136 Cede and Company, also known as "Cede and Co." or "Cede & Co.", is a specialist United States financial 
institution that processes transfers of stock certificates on behalf of Depository Trust Company, the central 
securities depository used by the United States National Market System, which includes the New York Stock 
Exchange, Nasdaq, and other exchanges together with associated clearinghouses. Cede & Co. owns 
substantially all of the publicly issued stock in the United States. Thus, investors do not themselves hold direct 
property rights in stock, but rather have contractual rights that are part of a chain of contractual rights involving 
Cede. See Bloomberg’s Company Overview of Cede & Company, available at: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=22429124  
137 See Matt Levine, Dole Food had too many shares; It’s enough to make you wish for a blockchain. 
Bloomberg (February, 2017), available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-02-17/dole-food-had-
too-many-shares  
See also Joshua Ashley Klayman et al, Why the Delaware Blockchain Initiative Matters to all Dealmakers. 
Forbes (September, 2017), available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2017/09/20/why-the-delaware-
blockchain-initiative-matters-to-all-dealmakers/#2ee375f27550  
See also In re Dole Food Co. Inc., No. CV 8703-VCL, 2017 WL 624843 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017). 
138 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20 (Del. Ch. 2016).  
139 For example, dividend covenants. 
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approved blockchain-friendly bills defining utility tokens and has also exempted them from 
the state’s money transmission licenses. The coalition has in mind the implementation of a 
similar initiative to the one passed in Delaware.140 European markets are being influenced 
by this initiative. In Germany, for example, models have been developed in which a 
nominee holds the company’s shares as a registered shareholder with tokens. These 
tokens embed smart contracts that provide for a type of trust agreement between the 
respective token holder and the nominee. The smart contract is supported by traditional 
legal solutions (written agreements), thus making the token holder only an indirect 
shareholder through the written agreement.141  
 
In sum, using blockchain technology in the corporate context could revolutionize corporate 
record-keeping, governance, finance and capital markets. The ICOs experience could 
bring knowledge to the table for regulators and companies to embrace this new technology 
in benefit of capital markets development. So far, developers incorporated through a 
simple Delaware corporation will probably take advantage of the Delaware Blockchain 
Initiative that would allow the entity to itself incorporate directly on a blockchain.  
 
X. Conclusion  
 
This paper has sought to provide an understanding of the legal and financial challenges of 
Initial Coin Offerings. For that purpose, we have started by proposing a concept of tokens 
based on both their functionality and their legal nature. From a legal perspective, tokens 
can be classified as security or non-security tokens. From a functional perspective, we 
have used the classification suggested by FINMA. Therefore, we have categorized tokens 
into utility tokens, payment tokens and asset tokens. This paper argues that the 
classification of tokens as ‘utility tokens’ or ‘security tokens’ used by many authors and 
regulators is not only technically incorrect but also misleading since  many ‘utility tokens’ 
can perfectly be classified as ‘security tokens’. Therefore, this classification should be 
abandoned. After analyzing this issue, it has been argued that the legal classification of 
the token will depend on the features, structure, distribution and marketing of the issuance 
of tokens, as well as a particular country´s applicable law. Therefore, even though the 
functionality of the token may provide some guidance about the legal nature of the token, a 
further analysis will be required in order to determine its legal classification.  
 
We have then analyzed the existing regulatory models to deal with ICOs, explaining why 
all of them present some flaws. For this reason, we have proposed a new system to deal 
with ICOs based on four primary pillars. First, any issuance of tokens, regardless of 
whether they are security or non-security tokens, should be disclosed to the regulator 
through an electronic form providing a minimum level of information. Second, the purchase 
of token pre-sales should be prohibited for commercial banks and pension funds. Third, 
regulators should protect non-security tokens through a variety of tools currently existing to 
                                                          
140 See Wyoming Blockchain Coalition website: http://wyomingblockchain.io/  
141 See André Eggert and Yamila Eraso, Delaware Blockchain Initiative: Revitalizing European Companies’ 
Funding Efforts, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 
(September, 2017), available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/21/delaware-blockchain-initiative-
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protect consumers. Fourth, regulators should spend more resources in providing 
information to consumers and investors about the risks associated with ICOs.  
 
After proposing a safe regulatory environment for ICOs, the paper has also analyzed a 
variety of legal and financial aspects of ICOs, including how to register an issuance of 
tokens from an accounting perspective, why the classification of tokens as debt or equity 
can be relevant, how a situation of insolvency may affect the buyers or sellers of tokens, 
and the particular challenges of ICOs from the perspective of data protection, privacy law 
and anti-money laundering. The paper concluded by analyzing the implications of the 
tokenization of securities for the future of capital markets. By providing a comprehensive 
and interdisciplinary analysis of ICOs, this paper seeks to help regulators and policy-
makers to deal with ICOs in a way that may promote innovation and firms’ access to 
finance without harming consumer and investor protection, market integrity and the 
stability of the financial system.  
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